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Summary findings
Problems of developing financial services for housing are  low loan-to-value ratios for CSH loans and a large
acute in transitional socialist economies. Lea and Renaud  financing gap for housing purchases.
examine contractual  savings for housing (CSH), which  From the perspective of financial institutions, CSH can
are often advocated as a primary solution, especially in  help overcome the severe information asymmetries they
Central and Eastern European countries. A CSH  face in transitional socialist economies, where there are
instrument links a phase of contractual savings  no retail financial markets, no credit bureaus, and
remunerated  at below-market rate to the promise of a  problematic income reporting. CSH are very effective in
housing loan at a rate also fixed below market at the  screening, monitoring, and establishing the reputation of
time the contract  is signed. This contract can contain a  steady savers as future borrowers, and they are good at
variety of options.  lowering credit risks. With their saving periods of four to
CSH were used very successfully in Europe after  five years, CSH also help bridge the gap between long-
World War 11.  The issue today is not whether such  term loans and short-term deposits. Finally, CSH can be
specialized instruments  can work. They clearly can under  an important  commercial tool for developing cross-
low inflation. The issue is whether CSH systems  are  lending activities. But CSH can be risky. When the
advisable today in latecomer countries with vastly  interest rate on outstanding contracts is low compared
different financial technology and financial policy  with current  market rates, holders of mature contracts
environments.  will want to call their loans. And new savers will be
Lea and Renaud focus on two influential CSH systems:  reluctant to sign on at very low contract rates.
the "closed" German Bauspar system and the "open"  Eliminating this liquidity risk with a "closed" CSH
French dpargne-logement.  In a "closed" CSH system,  system erodes the attractiveness of CSH.
access to a housing loan is based on queuing: a loan can  From the perspective of government, a CSH
be made only if funds are available in the specialist  instrument can work in a noninflationary environment,
institution. In an "open" system, the saver can legally call  yet a CSH system would have no justification in fully
his or her loan at contract maturity, regardless of the  developed and competitive financial markets today. CSH
liquidity conditions in the CSH system.  instruments can play a useful but not a dominant role in
From the perspective of households, CSH contracts  housing finance. After stabilization, they can provide
facilitate the accumulation of equity and offer the  "additionality," overcome information constraints on
prospect of a low-interest loan. They promote savings  financial contracts, and contribute to higher financial
discipline and provide a concrete goal that many  savings rates. CSH instruments are best used to finance
households find important.  But CSH instruments leave  home improvements. They can also be used as part of a
the objective of providing a primary loan unmet. In  social policy to reach targeted social groups.
addition,  even moderate inflation quickly leads to very
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ABSTRACT
Problems of developing specialized financial services for  housing are  acute in  transition socialist
economies (TSE).  Some constraints derive from the incomplete and imperfect privatization of the real
estate sector.  Others reflect the fragmented and  undeveloped financial system. This paper  examines a
financial instrument, contractual savings for housing (CSH),  that is often advocated as a major solution,
but usually without consideration of its impact on the emergence of a competitive housing finance system
and on overall financial development. Interest in CSH is high in Central and Eastern European countries.
Legislation  has already been passed in some of them  (Czech Republic and Slovakia) and is under serious
discussion  in others (such as Poland).
A CSH instrument is a dedicated loan-linked form of saving.  It links a phase of contractual savings
remunerated below market to the promise of a housing loan at a rate also fixed below market at the time
of contract signature.  The contract can contain a variety of incentives and options. CSH are advocated on
the basis of their positive historical record in continental Europe. They were originally designed decades
ago to generate long-term funds to be specifically  channeled into the housing sector at a time when long-
term finance was not available and reconstruction was a national priority.  In environments where savings
were very low, CSH encouraged household savings with the help of government incentives. They have also
been  implemented in  developing countries  as  well, often  with  very  mixed results  because  financial
conditions for their success were either not fully understood, or not met.  The issue is not whether such
specialized instruments  can work successfully.  They clearly can.  The issue is whether CSH syvtems
remain  advisable today to latecomer countries that  want to  develop competitive and  flexible rmancial
systems capable of integrating successfully  with the global rmancial markets.  It will take four to five years
for a new CSH system to begin to have an impact.  Would time, scarce financial skills and capital be more
productively used at developing  alternative solutions  to the problems CSH were solving  in decades past?
This evaluation  focuses on  two very large  and  influential CSH systems: the  "closed" German
Bauspar system and the "open" French epargne-logement.  In a "closed" CSH system access to the housing
loan is a based on queuing; it can be made only if funds are available within the specialist institution.  In
an  "open"  system, the  saver can  legally call  its loan  at  contract  maturity,  irrespective of  prevailing
liquidity conditions in the CSH system. The analysis examines these two types of CSH from the three very
distinct perspectives of  households, financial institutions, and  financial authorities responsible for  the
development of the entire financial  sector.
*  From  a  household perspective, CSH contracts  facilitate the  accumulation of equity, and  offer the
prospect of a low-interest loan. They establish a saving discipline  and provide a concrete goal that many
households  find important.  However,  in inflationary TSEs the guaranty of a loan will not be not enough
to achieve housing ownership.  CSH contracts are designed to operate in low inflation and stable real
interest rates environments.  Inflation levels  above 15% sharply erode the attractiveness of a CSH from
a  relative  cost or  affordability  perspective: a  widening financing gap  develops between the  CSH
financing available and the rapidly rising cost of a housing unit.  Conceptually, CSH instruments can be
designed to operate in inflationary environments but such a result is achieved at the price of very limited
usefulness to households. Even under  low inflation, CSH instruments are designed to built up initial
equity and to provide a second mortgage loan, leaving the provision  of a primary loan unmet. The paper
shows that even moderate inflation quickly leads to very low loan-to-value ratios for CSH loans. The
widening gap  must be financed with expensive -- or non-existent  -- market  rate  mortgage  loans.
*  Financial institutions  face severe information  asymmetries  in transition  economies where  there  are  no
retail financial markets, nor any form of credit bureaus, and income reporting is problematic. CSH are
very effective for  screening, monitoring and  establishing the reputation of steady savers as  future
borrowers, and  CSH contracts are good at lowering credit risks. Their screening efficacy is high.  For
instance, in France, delinquency and default rates for CSH loans are  10 times lower than  for other11
housing loans (for which  credit  risks are  already  low).  CSH with  their  4 to 5 years  saving  periods  also
reduce  the  duration  gap  between very  long term  mortgage  loans and  very short-term  deposit  liabilities.
From  a commercial  point  of view, CSH  can  be an  important  tool to stabilize  a  clientele  and  develop
cross lending  for a variety  of consumer,  microenterprise  and  small  business services.  However,  CSH
can  be  risky  for  financial  institutions  depending  on the  options  embedded  in the  contract.  When  the
interest  rate  level on  outstanding  contracts  is sharply  lower  than  current  market  rates,  holders  of
mature  contracts  will want  to call their  loans. On the  other hand,  new savers will be reluctant  to sign on
at very low contract  rates  when alternative  saving vehicles exist.  As the  CSH circuit  itself matures  and
the  growth  of  new  contracts  levels off,  an  institution  may  be  forced  to  ration  CSH  loans  through
increased  waiting  periods  or  turn  to expensive market  rate  sources  of funds.  Eliminating  liquidity  risk
through  queues with a "closed"  CSH like the German  Bauspar,  erodes the attractiveness  of a CSH.
*  From a government  perspective, encouraging  CSH systems does not per se address  the  shortage  of long-
term  mortgage  lending  because  a CSH  contract  is not designed  to be the  primary  source  of  long-term
mortgage  finance. Under  pressure  to mobilize larger  volumes of long-term  funds and  raise  the aggregate
household  savings  rate,  governments  may agree  to "open"  CSH  contract  designs with  overly generous
options  in  the  takeoff  phase  of  the  CSH  system  such  as  untargeted  interest  rate  subsidies  and  tax
benefits.  The most  important  lesson of experience  with such "open"  contracts  is that  they can  be  very
successful  in mobilizing  funds,  but at the cost of creating  large  contingent  liabilities  for the government
at  the  worst  time  in  financial  cycles.  Control  of  such  risks  may  then  lead  financial  authorities  to
perpetuate  various  forms of directed  credits.  With the continued  segregation  of housing finance  circuits
from  the rest  of the financial  system further  come inefficiencies that  such compartimentalization  usually
entail.
A CSH instrument  can work successfully in a non-inflationary  environment,  yet a CSH system would
have  no justification  in  fully  developed  and  competitive  financial  markets  today.  The  more  a  transition
economy  is advanced  economically,  stable  financially,  and  rapidly  converging  with  international  financial
markets,  the  least  likely is a  CSH  system to make a difference.  Before  introducing  any  CSH,  government
policy  makers  should  identify  and  thoroughly  investigate:  (a) the  general  housing  finance  system that  they
intend  to promote  and  how it will interact  with the overall  financial  system,  and  (b) the  financial  costs and
benefits  of every  option  embedded  in the  proposed  contract.  A danger  with promoting  CSH  today  is that
they  may  be distracting  attention  away  from  the  steps  needed  for the  development  of a  complete  housing
finance  system.  Instead  of  promoting  sectorally  restricted  CSH  instruments,  the  financial  priority  is to
develop  broadly-based  contractual  savings  such  as  pension  funds  and  life  insurance  systems  which  are
needed  in any  case.  A frequent  financial  policy gap in TSEs which  is highlighted  by promoters  of CSHs  is
the  lack of coherent  policies towards  savings  markets  and  retail  finance  (including  credit  bureaus).  Instead
of promoting  special financial  circuits  that  they hope to control,  line ministries  responsible  for housing  and
construction  should work on removing  the legal and regulatory  obstacles to market-based  finance  that  affect
credit  risk  and  the quality  of real estate collateral.  In  many semi-reformed  economies, the  legacy of former
urban  planning  and  approval  systems significantly increase  investment  uncertainty  and  the price of housing.
Low interest  special circuits  cannot  be used  to solve affordability  problems  originating  from  inferior  urban
policies and  processes  without imposing large costs to the national  economy.
To summarize,  CSH  instruments  can  play  a useful  but  not  dominant  role.  After  stabilization,  they
can provide "additionality",  overcome  information  problems  afflicting financial  contracts,  and contribute  to
higher financial  savings rates.  CSH instruments  are best used to finance home improvements.  They can also
be  used  to reach  targeted  social  groups  not  served  by the  banking  system  and  needing  to establish  their
credit  worthiness.  Such  CSH  use  is superior  to  politically  exposed,  administered  public  programs  in
reaching  such groups  because  a CSH  provides  more consumer  choice, implies self-selection  and  encourages
savings  discipline.  The  potential  impact  of  every  option  embedded  in  a  CSH  contract,  especially  loan
multipliers  and call rights  needs to be controlled.  This is why "closed"  are preferable  to "open"  contracts.iii
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I.  INTRODUCTION
1.1  Housing as One of the Four Big Privatizations
1.  The privatization and revival of housing and real estate markets in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union has the potential to make a major contribution to
their overall economic recovery and restructuring.  These countries are privatizing large-
scale  enterprises  and  industrial  kombinats;  medium  and  small-scale  enterprises;
agriculture;  and, housing.  Housing assets alone represent a fifth to a  fourth of all the
assets to be privatized.  If non-residential assets are added, the share of the real estate
sector in national assets is even larger.  Given the high level of urbanization of many of
these countries, the dominant issue is often less the need for large net additions of new
housing to the existing stock than the possibility to trade units freely and efficiently in
order to restructure the sector.  The prospect for using real estate as loan collateral by
emerging small and medium businesses is also an  important feature of market revival.
However, a major constraint to active trading and the development of broadly-based real
estate markets is the absence of long-term housing finance and related banking services.
This  paper does  not  address  the full housing finance  agenda.  Rather,  it evaluates  a
specific type of financial instrument which has often been proposed to  fund long-term
housing  loans:  contract savings for  housing.  Our central concern  is the long-term
impact  of  such  instruments  on  the  development  of  the  fledgling  financial  markets
emerging  out  of the  rubble of  the old  financing  systems of  central planning,  and  in
particular on the development of financial savings.2
1.2 Absence of Long-term Finance and Proposals for CSH Systems
2.  Contract Savings for Housing ("CSH") systems have been advocated as a
solution to the problems of insufficient long-term savings and  funding for housing  in
Transitional Socialist Economies (TSEs).'  These systems originated in Germany after
World War I (the Bauspar system) and were revived in that country and in Austria before
developing in France (L'Epargne Logement) after the second World War as mechanisms
to address the financing needs of the housing sector. The current attractiveness of CSH to
reformers stems in part from parallels that they draw between the economic, financial and
housing market conditions that existed in Western Europe after the War and those that
prevail  today  in  the  TSEs:  an  absence  of  long-termn savings,  a  perceived  housing
shortage, affordability problems as evidenced by extremely high price-to-income ratios,
high  and volatile inflation, reduced real incomes, and the absence of private financial
services for housing and the household sector.  CSH programs have recently been started
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  In addition they have been proposed in Hungary,
Poland and Russia.
3.  CSH contract instruments used in Continental Europe derive from the early
U.K. experiences with mutual forms of housing finance.  They involve a contract on the
part of a household to save an agreed amount over a prescribed period in return for a
commitment on the part of a financial institution to provide a loan, at pre-specified terms,
for the purchase or renovation of owner-occupied housing.  CSH  are characterized by
fixed, below-market rates on savings and subsequent loans.  By design, CSH attempt to
insulate households from financial market volatility. An important part of the appeal of
these systems lies in the promise of eventual loan availability at a predetermined rate of
interest.
4.  CSH systems have had a  very significant degree of  success in post-War
Europe.  They addressed two of the most vexing issues confronting TSEs today: lack of
adequate information on borrowers and on properties to assess and manage credit risk,
and lack of long-term funding for housing. By saving regularly over an extended period
of time, a household evidences financial responsibility which may signal reduced credit
risk.  The savings form a pool of long-term funds for downpayments and long term loans.
It is important  not to confuse  the loan-linked  "contract  savings  for housing"  which  are the focus  of
this paper with the general category of "contractual  savings"  encountered  in discussions  of financial  sector
development. "Contractual  savings"  ordinarily  refer to pension funds and life insurance. In modem financial
systems, "contractual  savings"  usually  are a major  source  of market-based  long-term  finance.5.  The question treated in this  paper is whether these systems are likely  to
meaningfully solve  the housing finance  shortage in TSEs today.  Comparing with the
post-War European environment, doubts arise for two reasons.  The most direct is the
presence  of  high  and  volatile  rates  of  inflation  which  make  CSH  unattractive  to
households and risky for financial institutions.  On a more general level, the character of
financial markets is vastly different today than it was when the successful European CSH
systems were created.  The revolution in information technology, financial instrument
innovation,  financial deregulation, the opening of current and capital accounts and the
globalization of capital markets have led to a decline in special  circuits of finance for
housing in many of the industrial countries with which TSE economies interact and  aim
to converge.  TSE countries can and should learn from this experience in creating their
financial  systems.  The  special  circuits  on  which  CSH  systems  are  built  are  very
congenial to the behavioral legacy of the administrative command systems of TSEs, but
where  do  they  fit  in  the  development  of  broad-based  contractual  savings  systems,
competitive long-term finance, and modem financial market development?
1.3  Three Perspectives for the Evaluation of CSH Systems
6.  Traditional analyses of CSH instruments have been mostly technical giving
almost exclusive attention to the mathematical features of an individual contract.  Very
little attention has been given to the relevance of these financial instruments and CSH
systems to financial development nor to their systemic benefits and costs. 2 This  paper
analyzes CSH systems from the perspective of long-term financial sector development.
Are CSH likely to be successful in mobilizing long term savings for housing in TSEs?
Are CSH  adaptable to  a changing macroeconomic and financial market  environment?
What risks do CSH present, both to the institutions that offer them and a government that
supports them?  Should housing finance be provided through special circuits or should
transition  economies  be  encouraged  to  rely  from  the  start on  the  broader financial
markets and capital markets given the weak state of their financial systems, and problems
faced in financing other sectors of the economy?
7.  CSH  systems  have  been  implemented  in  a  number  of  developed  and
developing  countries over  the  last two  decades. 3 However, a  full inventory of  such
2  A notable  exception  is Borsch-Supan  and Stahl  [1991].
3  In addition  to France  and Germany,  CSH and various forms  of loan-linked  deposits are in use or
have  been proposed in Austria,  Spain, Tunisia,  Morocco,  Chile, Indonesia,  India, Thailand. The specific
instruments  selected have been offshoots  of either  the French  or German  designs,  which themselves  built4
experiences is not necessary.  The critical features of CSH and their dynamic interaction
with the financial system can be effectively understood through a study of the two largest
CSH systems in existence today: those of Germany and France.  These two systems are
analyzed from three different perspectives: those of households, lending institutions and
national governments.  The risks and returns to each participant in such systems of loan-
linked deposit contracts differ, and before encouraging the adoption of CSH instruments
the following questions should be answered:
*  Why would a household enter into a CSH?  To what types of borrowers and under
what financial market conditions is a CSH attractive'?
*  Why  would  a  lending  institution  offer a  CSH?  Are  the risks  manageable  in
different  macroeconomic environments?
*  How do CSH system contribute to the development of financial markets and the
housing sector?  What difficulties do financial authorities face in regulating the
system?
8.  The organization of the paper follow from the questions just  raised.  First
we present the main characteristics of the transition economies and the factors affecting
the development of housing finance: macroeconomic conditions; the extent and nature of
housing  privatization as it affects the demand for mortgage finance; and  the difficult
conditions of their financial systems.  Second we present the factors affecting the design
of CSH instruments and compare the features of the "closed"  German  CSH systems with
those of the "open" French CSH system. 4 Third, we evaluate these two types of systems
from  the  three  viewpoints  of  households,  financial  institutions,  and  governments.
Finally,  we  evaluate  the  suitability  of  CSH  instruments  and  systems  to  transition
economies.
upon early British forms of mutual savings. For a paper retracing  the conceptual  link between  mutual
credit  (credit diffrre-)  and the French  CSH  system  of dpargne-logement, see Thomas  (1994).
4  A "closed" CSH system  is defined as one which is strictly of a mutual  nature between savings
contracted  and loans made. An "open" system  is defined  as one where  the tight link between  saving phase
and borrowing  phase is loosened  by external  incentives  and options  provided  by the government  in order to
mobilize  funds at an accelerated  pace.5
II.  MAIN  FEATURES  OF  TRANSITION  ECONOMIES  AFFECTING
HOUSING  FINANCE
9.  An effective evaluation of CSH instruments requires a characterization of
the  financial  environment  in  which  they  are  expected  to  operate.  There  are  very
significant differences between the post-war economies of Western Europe and current
conditions  in  TSE  countries.  Their  atrophied  banking  systems  designed  for  central
planning are undergoing a large scale overhaul, the macroeconomic environment often
remains unstable, the extent of privatization of their housing systems varies considerably
and follows different paths.  Most of them have comparatively underdeveloped financial
systems,  especially if compared  with  post-War Western Europe.  The introduction of
CSH systems therefore raises fresh questions.
2.1  Caught Between Plan and Market
10.  In the long catalogue of TSE economic problems, the two main headings are
privatization and banking sector reform. In many ways, rapid privatization in the real
sector is the most important step, both by itself and as a critical  ingredient of banking
reform.  However, privatization will not succeed without reform of the banking system.
The  major  problems  facing  TSE  banks  are  a  lack  of  capital  and  a  lack  of  lending
experience.  Under central planning, banks were not really banks.  They were accounting
and  auditing  arms  of  the  administrative-command  system,  functioning  as  disbursing
agents.  Banks did not make independent lending decisions, they did not face any risk,
and the soft-budget constraint enjoyed by production agents governed their operations.
Even after new sectoral banks were carved out of the old monobank structure, the system
has  been slow to  change.  Former  state  banks  have been  slow to  respond  to  credit
demand, particularly from newly formed companies.  When credit has been available, it
has been at very high real  interest rates.  The banks have charged very high  margins
reflecting in  part their questionable balance  sheets often burdened by defaulted loans
from  current  or  newly  privatized  state  enterprises.  They also  arise from  very  high
operating costs and limited competition.
11.  The financing problems faced in the housing sector are particularly severe.
Under central planning, most of the urban housing stock was under public ownership and
most  production  was carried  out  by  state  organizations.  Households played  a  very6
passive role.  Their contributions were marginal as most of the funding for new housing
and  operations  and  maintenance  came  directly  from  central  and  local  budgets  or
indirectly through state enterprises.  The minimal contribution of households was made
clear by extremely low rents.  Today, recreating housing and real estate markets has a
very high priority.  Their revival will have major sectoral and aggregate benefits, social as
well as economic. 5 However, even if the existing housing stock were privatized swiftly, a
broad-based revival  of the sector would remain severely constrained by the absence of
financial services.  Mortgage lending is often a very new concept. In many countries it is
barely  operational.  On  the  funding  side,  market-based  long-term  finance  is  almost
universally  missing  and  vehicles  for  voluntary  mobilization  do  not  exist.  Public
expectations and  the banking culture are still colored by central planning  when funds
were funneled through the state or lent at subsidized rates to enterprises or cooperatives.
12.  There  are  three  main  reasons  why  market-based  long-term  finance  for
housing  is not  yet available  in the TSEs.  First,  inflation has  been high  and remains
volatile in most of these countries, discouraging long term savings.  Therefore banks lack
long-term funding sources to finance a long-term durable good such as housing.  Second,
due to the inherited legal and institutional environment, owner-occupied housing is not
viewed as a very good collateral for lending.  Foreclosure when feasible is usually long
and costly.  In some countries, lenders cannot obtain possession of a unit from a defaulted
borrowers without provision of substitute housing (as in the case of rental eviction) and
then only after a long and uncertain foreclosure process.  Third, restructuring old banks as
well as emerging new banks are relatively illiquid.  They concentrate on short term trade
and foreign currency services which are profitable and have a short time horizon.  The
banks prefer to invest excess liquidity in governnent  securities which offer superior risk
adjusted returns relative to consumer and housing loans.
5  See Renaud,  1992  "The  Housing  System  of the Former  Soviet  Union:  Why  do the  Soviets  Need
Housing  Markets?",  Housing  Policy  Debate,  Volume  3, Issue, Fall 1992.7
2.2  TSE Macroeconomic Environments
13.  The  macro  policies  pursued  during  the  transition  interact  with  the
development  of  long-term  finance.  All  TSEs  have  experienced  significant  inflation
reflecting  the  sharp  initial  price  adjustments  which  have  usually  followed  the
liberalization of prices and creation of private markets. 6 The present distinction between
high inflation and low inflation in the case of most TSEs  is still one between extreme
inflation in excess of 100 percent per year and "moderate" inflation with persistent annual
rates of 15 to 30 percent.  Achieving consistent single-digit levels of annual inflation is
proving  difficult to most  TSE governments because this  requires profound  fiscal  and
financial  reforms  together  with  credible  macroeconomic  policies. 7 The  pattern  of
inflation observed  in Central and Eastern Europe over the last five years has been as
follows (Table 1):
Table  1
TSE Annual GDP Deflators, 1989-93 (percent)
Country  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  (est.)
Poland  298.5  480.1  50.9  36.5  34.0
Hungary  18.7  25.7  23.2  17.7  18.7
CSFR  2.4  8.6  45.7  8.5  19.8
Romania  -1.0  13.6  194.4  214.7  239.4
Bulgaria  6.7  26.2  227.0  58.4  41.3
Source: World Bank data
14  There is no escaping the fact that the real estate sector,  including housing,
is one  of the sectors of the economy most sensitive to monetary policy,  inflation and
interest rate volatility.  If governments do not succeed in achieving conditions favorable
6  See Leszek  Balcerowicz  and Alan Gelb "Macropolicies  in Transition  to a Market  Economy:  A Three-
Year Perspective",  paper presented at the Annual World Bank Conference  on  Development  Economics,
Washington  D.C.  April 1994.
7  For a  discussion  of the technical difficulties  inherent in stopping inflation quickly, see Rudiger
Dornbusch  and Stanley Fisher, "Moderate  Inflation", The World Bank Economic Review,  Vol. 7, January
1993,  No.1.  Some TSE economies  like Estonia  have successfully  switched to a currency board system of
monetary  management  and broken  inflationary  expectations.  Domestic  interest  rates will then tend to be align
themselves  on those  of the currency  of reference,  in this case  the Deutsch  Mark.8
to the growth of market-based long-term finance, they run the risk of being drawn into
direct interventions and making housing finance a de facto  annex of monetary and fiscal
policy.  The resulting directed credit policies can usually go two ways: they may mean
deliberate credit rationing of the sector as in Japan and Korea during their peak period of
urbanization, or preferred treatment as in the Nordic  countries and France after  World
War II.
Table 2
Pre-Reform Urban Housing Ownership and Housing Contraction in TSEs
Country  Private  Fall in National
Ownership  Housing Output
l___________  1988-89  (1000 units)
Poland  excl. coop:  23.5%  1980: 217.1
l_________  incl. coop:  60.2%  1991: 136.8
Hungary  Budapest:  48.6%  1980: 89.1
other cities: 71.1%  1991: 33.2
CSFR  excl. coop:  46.1%  1980: 69.3
incl. coop:  65.0%  1991:  62.5
Bulgaria  77.5%  1980: 128.9
1991:  19.4
Estonia  18.0%  1987: 14.0
1991: 5.2
Latvia  15.0%  1987: 23.0
1990: 13.6
Lithuania  21.0%  1987: 32.1
1990: 23.1
Russia  16.0%  1987: 1324
1992:  691
Source:  World  Bank  missions  and country  national  statistics
2.3  Common Features of TSE Housing Markets
15.  The level demand for mortgage finance is directly related to the purchase of
new or existing units and thus to the level of privatization of the housing stock.  Some
countries  have  privatized  much  faster  than  others.  Initial  conditions  also  differed
markedly.  At  the beginning of the  transition  in  1989, private  ownership of  housing9
varied sharply from country to country, and between the capital region and the rest of the
country:
16.  There is direct functional link between the restructuring of banking systems
and that of the sector they are financing.  Statistics comparable across countries are not
yet available on the degree and speed of privatization of TSE housing stocks.8 For the
most  part, the ownership  of the non-owner-occupied  stock has  been transferred  from
national to  municipal  governments.  These entities have not  been  able to  privatize  a
significant portion  of the stock due to the presence of rent controls and deeply below
market rents.  In such situations, residents have been reluctant to give up the benefits of
pre-existing  housing  subsidy  for  the  perceived  vagaries  of  ownership  with  higher
operating costs.  As a consequence, housing has been a significant drain on the finance of
municipal governments.  Another characteristic of TSE housing markets is the impaired
efficiency of residential real estate as loan collateral.  Under some post-socialist housing
codes, if a lender wished to foreclose on a defaulted loan and had taken the property in
lieu of repayment, it would have had to provide substitute housing for the occupant.  In
all  cases  foreclosure  is  costly,  lengthy  and  uncertain.  This  collateral  gap  is  very
significant because it amplifies the impact of the lack of credit history and meaningful
borrower income data in these countries.
17.  As Table 2 shows, housing construction  output has plummeted from pre-
transition levels in all TSE countries.  The collapse of output is linked to abrupt cutbacks
in the financing of public production during the stabilization of the economy.  It is not
clear  at all,  however,  that restoring annual output to  its former  levels is  a  matter of
national or even sectoral priority because the distortions caused by rent control mask the
true  demand-supply  balance  in  these  countries.  However,  this  collapse  of  output
concerns construction officials and has led to many proposals for revitalizing the sector.
18.  The level of demand for housing in TSEs is difficult to ascertain, in part
because realistic prices have yet to develop.  Housing market prices are determined at the
margin  by  the  minority  of  households  now  enjoying  market  salaries.  However,
comparing these prices to the low salaries inherited from the planning era for the most
numerous middle-income population creates the perception of extreme unaffordability.
8  Direct  comparisons  of private  ownership  levels  in TSE  with Westem  Europe  can be misleading
Apartment  units may have been privatized  without clarification  of the ownership  of the land on which
buildings  rest, or condominium  laws  to allocate  shares  of public  spaces  within  the  building. Inadequate
property information  then remains  a barrier  to housing  finance  and/or  raises its cost.10
Not until an active resale market develops based on the average income and purchasing
power of households can the actual level of effective demand be estimated. 9
2.4  TSE Financial Systems
19.  TSE  financial  systems  are  characterized  by  a  lack  of  sound  financial
contracts during the early stages of their transition to market economies.  On the asset
side of the household balance sheet there is a dearth of formal financial sector investment
alternatives.'0 On the liability side,  there is a lack of credit available through the banking
system.  The primary problem is the lack of long term funds.  Macroeconomic instability
exacerbates household liquidity preference, reducing savings held in banking institutions.
Households also often mistrust such institutions given their recent history of state control,
and  still  limited  interest  in  consumer  services.  Broadly-based  contractual  savings
vehicles (e.g., pension and insurance plans) either do not exist or are in the early stages of
development.  The lack of long-term funds limits the potential of banking institutions to
offer credit for housing, particularly at terms affordable to most households.  Uncertainty
over the quality of their pre-transition loan portfolios and their ability to access collateral
in the event of loan default also inhibits bank lending and contributes to high real interest
rates. Table 3 summarizes TSE financial sector characteristics.
9  In retrospect,  rapid  privatization  of the housing  stock  for free  or at low  cost  was  one of the best
ways  to reconstitute  market  wages  by  transferring  back  to households  with  low  socialist  wages  a very  large
housing  asset.  Such  privatization  had the additional  benefit  of providing  a degree  of protection  against
inflation  and  the erosion  of purchasing  power. Broad  based  privatization,  followed  by trading  of existing
unit  can  be expected  to lower  housing  price-to-income  ratios  to realistic  levels.  Early  PIR  values  are  totally
unrepresentative  for  affordability  analyses  and  other  policy  uses. They  are the  ratio  of new  housing  prices
for the highest  income  groups  who enjoy market  wages  to the low socialist  wages of the average
population  further  depressed  because  satbilization  policies  entailed  a decline  in real  wages.
10  Given  the  way  housing  was  provided  by the  state  for very  large  segments  of the population,  one
does  not  yet  observe  in TSEs  the  very  large  impact  that  housing  has  on household  sector  balance-sheets  in
market  economies  where  it is the dominant  asset.  Privatization,  and the  revaluation  of formerly  depressed
real  estate  assets  are changing  the  situation  fast,  especially  in the largest  cities.I1
Table 3
TSE Financial Sector Characteristics
Entities  Characteristics
Households  Lack of savings options (esp. long-term
contractual)
Lack of borrowing options; only short loan terms
High real borrowing rates
Extreme liquidity preference
Financial  Illiquid
Institutions  Lack of long term funds
Questionable loan quality, moral hazard
Lack of risk management tools and procedures
High costs & spreads
Need to recapitalize
Not fully competitive market structure
Government  Need to mobilize private savings
Pressures to subsidize credit and maintain output
Desire to encourage capital market development
Large budget deficits (social entitlements, state
enterprise sector)
20.  An example of the maturity mismatch of a TSE banking system can be seen
by examining the aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector of Slovakia (Table 3).  As
of June  1993, only 3.5 percent  of banking system  deposits were 4 years  or longer in
maturity and only 28.3 percent  were one year or longer in maturity.'"  In contrast, 42
percent of loans were in excess of 4 years.  Similar conditions prevail in most TSEs .
The higher  recent  inflation  experience  has been, the  more pronounced the  maturity
mismatch of banking sector balance-sheets.
Note that the average lending rate declines by term reflecting  the legacy of subsidized loans
originated  prior to liberalization.12
Table 4
Structure of Bank Deposits and Credits by Sector
Slovak Republic, June 1993
(Slovak Crowns in Billions)
Deposits  Short Term  Medium Term  Long Term  Total
(< I year)  (1-4 years)  (> 4 years)
Average Deposit  10.7  13.0  13.0
R ate__  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _
Enterprises  26,489  245  319  27,059
Financial Institutions  2,342  13,068  0  15,410
Households  69,369  31,116  6,198  106,683
Private Sector  19,198  990  1  20,189
Other  17,020  1,319  0  18,340
Total  134,427  46,738  6,515  187,681
Credits
Average Loan Rate  18.2  15.8  9.8
Enterprises  62,816  18,883  49,560  131,260
Financial Institutions  0  15  0  15
Households  1,375  7,712  19,945  29,032
Private Sector  27,994  21,131  33,372  82,497
Other  594  1,133  1,883  3,611
Total  92,779  48,874  104,760  246,417
Source:  National Bank of Slovakia
2.5  Gaps in TSE Financial Systems
21.  There  are a  variety  of  gaps  in  the  institutional  fabric  of  TSE  financial
systems.  These gaps include:
*  Lack  of  effective demand for  mortgage finance  from  households.  There  is only
limited experience with direct, long-term lending to households. The only  "retail
banking"  institution in  most  socialist  economies  was the national  savings bank
which mobilized resources from the surplus sector, i.e. the households, and passed13
them on to  the central bank  for allocation among specialized banks serving  key
sectors  such  as  industry,  agriculture  and  construction  (for  public  works  and
industrial facilities).  Only a very small proportion of deposits were for individual
loans.  Where  households  were  concerned,  group  lending  to  state  controlled
cooperatives was preferred.  As a result,  the public is not well educated about the
benefits  of mortgage  loans  and very  reluctant to  incur debt.  There  is an  even
greater reluctance to consider loans at variable rates.
Lack  of long term savings vehicles in the financial  system.  The accumulation of
long  term savings was not really  encouraged by the socialist system.  Although
private  pension  funds  and  life  insurance  fumds exist,  governments  are  often
concerned with large unfunded pension liabilities.  Moreover, the state institutions
are funding other public sector liabilities.  Dependence on central bank discount
facilities to fund housing cannot be a viable solution as it would fuel inflationary
pressures  and  instability  and  effectively  preclude  the  emergence  of  long-term
housing finance itself.
*  Lack  of lending experience and weak credit management skills.  These banks are
the only  ones to  have extensive retail networks  from the days when  they were
monopoly collectors of household deposits under central planning.  They did very
little or no retail lending since their main role was to finance the state plan.  In
some  countries like Poland, the state savings bank still maintains a monopolistic
dominance with 75 percent of all household deposits and 50 percent of the deposits
of the banking system.  Many of the state banks labor under the burden of large
portfolios  of  under  water  socialist  loans.  Through  inexperience  and  weak
management, new forays into commercial lending have led to a new crop of non-
performing loans.  Other types of state banks have few branches and obtain most of
their funds from the central bank, interbank loans from the savings bank, and more
rarely  the  state  pension  and  insurance  plans.  Too  often,  their  best  staff  are
preoccupied with  restructuring old debt and  solving the insolvency problems  of
new bad debts caused by their traditional borrowers.
*  Lack of servicing infrastructure and perceived political  risk of mortgage lending.
Emerging new banks are only serving emerging private enterprises.  They do not
wish  to  be  involved  in  retail  mortgage  lending  which  they  perceive  as  less
profitable and administratively more costly than repeated lending to business firms.14
These new banks are often quite small and view mortgage lending as an activity
unlikely to develop scale economies in the near term.  The  entire  banking
sector  shies  away  from  mortgage  lending because  of  the  concern that  national
parliaments view housing as a "social sector" to which "low cost funds" should be
allocated at preferential rates below markets.  This is not an unreasonable fear when
access  to  home  ownership  at  market  prices  and  without  subsidized  credit  is
impossible to a very broad, middle class section of the population in countries.
2.5  Why The Current Interest in CSH Systems?
22.  CSH programs aim to address the lack of long-term finance in a way that can
meet the interests of households, financial institutions and governments.  CSH provide a
long-term savings option for households made attractive by linking the accumulation of
savings (for a downpayment) to the availability of a loan in the future. The promise of a
loan at a predetermined  fixed rate of interest is appealing to  households in a  volatile
financial market environment; particularly if the rate is below market, thereby enhancing
affordability.  Through  CSH,  lending  institutions seek to  attract the  long term  funds
necessary  to  make  housing  loans  to  their  growing client  base.  The requirement  to
maintain  funds on account  for a  minimum period of  time  and the  incentive to  make
regular deposits built into most CSH systems may be seen by lenders as providing the
necessary liquidity and long-term funding to support long-term, amortizing housing loans
that are affordable to their borrowers. Governments see CSH as a means to stimulate the
mobilization  of  private  savings  to  finance  activities  which  have  traditionally  been
provided by the state.1 2 They may also see CSH as a relatively low risk and low cost
means of  providing housing  credit particularly to  low and middle  income households.
Governments may also view CSH as a means to stimulate a depressed, labor-intensive
sector with an output that has fallen to a third or less of previous levels and to encourage
individual ownership and better maintenance of the existing housing stock.
23.  CSH play an important signaling role and can be viewed as a remedy to the
lack of reliable information on borrowers for long term lending.  The lack of  lending
experience  in  TSE  countries means that  borrowers have no  credit histories.  Income
12  Barely emerging from central planning, governments  also may seek to direct credit to certain
activities  such as export industries  in order to "jump  start" the recovery  process. CSH may be  seen as a way
of finance  housing  demand  outside  of the banking  system  for countries  with this objective.  Among15
verification  is  notoriously  difficult  and  misreporting  pervasive  for  both  technical
(deficient information systems for the gray and the new economy)  and political reasons
(deep aversion to the intrusion of institutions into private household matters). CSH allow
households  to establish  a financial record through  successful completion  of a  savings
contract.  Compared with short-term trade finance, mortgage loan origination represents a
very  infrequent  interaction  between  a  bank  and  a  given  housing  borrower.  The
interactions  between  the  bank  and  savers  which  are  triggered  by  a  CSH  prior  to
borrowing  therefore  remedy  the  severe  information gap  which  does  not  exist  when
businesses engage in repeated short-term trade finance. The absence of property markets
also  means that  mechanisms  to  establish  and  monitor  collateral  value  are  also  non-
existent  or  just  emerging,  particularly  in  the  trading  of  existing  property.  The
prescreening  inherent in the savings process together with relatively  low loan-to-value
ratios can compensate for uncertainties regarding collateral access and valuation in the
housing finance process.
III.  BASIC FEATURES  OF CONTRACT  SAVINGS FOR HOUSING
3.1  Basic Structure of a CSH
24.  In its simplest form, a CSH involves an agreement between a household and
a  financial institution regarding the  granting of a  loan at a  future date  dependent  on
successful  fulfillment  of  a  savings contract.  The household  agrees to  save  either  a
prespecified total  or a certain minimum amount each year.  At the end of the savings
period, the household becomes eligible for a loan the amount of which is dependent on
the amount saved.
25.  There are typically three distinct phases in the contract life (Figure 1):  the
savings period leading up to qualification, the wait period after qualification until a loan
is granted and the loan period.  The actual time frames vary depending on the system
and/or contract chosen.16
Figure 1: CSH  Phases
Savings  Wait  Loan
Period  Period  Period
Years
0  4  515
The loan maturity of 15 years for the CSH loan presented  in Figure I is a maximum.
Typical  CSH loans  are usually  second  loans  of shorter maturity  than typical  market based
main mortgage  loans. In case  of loans for renovation  of existing  housing units, loans are
even shorter. The average  maturity  is closer  to 10 years.
3.2 Two Dominant  Models  of CSH
26.  Although  there are many possible  CSH designs, two dominant  models exist; the
French  Epargne-Logement  and  the  German Bauspar.  These  two  models  differ
substantially  in their basic structure  and options as shown  in Table 1. This table provides
general descriptions.  In Germany,  individual  institutions  may offer variants on the basic
plans.  For that country descriptions refer to programs extant in  1991.13  The French
description  applies  to the more popular  Plan d'epargne-logement or PEL.  14
13  For a  recent consumer review of  Bauspar contracts, including ratings and  a  ranking of
Bausparkassen  see "Bausparen"  in FINANZtest,  May 1994,  pp. 14-28. This review is published  by TEST
Stiftung  a private,  non-profit  consumer  foundation.
14  For more detail in English  see Diamond  and Lea [1992b].  The full French reference  is L'Epargne-
Logement,  Association  Fran,aise des Banques,  1987  and regular  AFB notices  on laws and decrees  modifying
contract  rules thereafter.17
Table  1:
CONTRACTS  SAVINGS FOR HOUSING  COMPARED:
FRANCE  and GERMANY.
FEATURES  Epargne-Logement  (PEL)  Bauspar
l  _______________________  (France)  (Germany)
Provider  Commercial  and  Savings Banks  Specialized  institution
1.  SAVINGS PHASE
Initial  Savings Deposit  Small minimum  No minimum
Minimum  Annual  Savings  Yes.  No, but preference  will be
l_______________________  lEarly  deposits  are  rewarded  given  to regular  savers
Minimum  Total  Savings  Initial + annual  + interest  Preset  by saver  in contract
Maximum  Savings Amount  Yes  No
Savings Interest  Rate  Competitive  after-tax  yield  Below market  after-tax  yield
Savings Liquidity  Yes.  Moreover contract  No.  Therefore  existence  of
transferable  to relative.  "interim"  loans.
Government  Incentives:  1. Full interest  tax free  1. Full interest  tax-free
1. tax-free  yield?  2. State  interest  subsidy  2. Income  targeted  interest
2. Interest  subsidy?  ("interest  premium")  based  on  subsidy, but only for housing
interest  paid  by the bank.  loan.
Ceiling  of FF10,000.
2. MINIMUM  WAITING  4 years (except 1981-1992: 5  2 years
PERIOD  years)
Some contract  benefits  extended
on request.  10 year-limit  since
1992.
3. LOAN PHASE
Date of Loan Availability  Right to loan immediately  at the  After waiting period of uncertain
end of the savings  phase, with  duration
option to call loan extensible  up to
10 years.
Maximum Loan Amount  Loan such that interest paid on  Multiple of contracted savings
loan equals 2.5 times interest  amount (I -1.5 times)
earned in savings.  Ceiling of
FF400,000.18
Loan Term  2 to 15 years  at borrower's  option,  6-15 years at borrower's  option;
but constrained  by interest  rules.  rules give preference  to shorter
term  loans
Loan Rate  Contract  deposit rate  paid by bank  Minimum  spread  of 2%  over
plus regulated  servicing fee.  saving rate.
Loan Payment  Level  Level
Loan Servicing  fee  1.70% of outstanding  principal  2%  spread
4. CONTRACT  OPTIONS
On State  Interest  Subsidy  State interest  subsidy have ranged  State subsidy is part  of the
from 419  to 2/7 of bank  interest  on  contract
savings available  after  contract
maturity  with or without loan.
On Transfer  of Rights  Mature  contract  benefits can be  Limited transfer
transferred  to relative to improve
subsidy + maturity  of a loan.
On Uses of the Loan  purchase  of new unit, existing unit,  Purchase,  construction,
new secondary  residence,  rehabilitation.
rehabilitation,  energy  retrofit,
housing REIT  (since 1993).
On Timing  of Loan  Once contract  matures,  up to saver  Up to lender,  but actually
responding  to market  conditions.  according  to prespecified
Right to a loan can be extended  to  queuing  rules.
10 years.
On Tax Free Interest  Bank- paid contract  interest  Not applicable
remains tax free beyond the  10 year
limit.
3.3  German "Closed" System and Strategy Behind the French "Open" System
27.  The characteristics and behavior of the German and the French CSH systems
differ.  The most important difference is that we define the German system as "closed" and
the French system as "open". By closed we mean that the German system follows a strict
principle  of  mutuality  and  transparency.  CSH  deposits  are mobilized  by  a  specialized
institution, the Bausparkasse.  These funds are only available to make loans to participants.
In case the funds available are not adequate to meet current CSH loan demand, participants
will be served according to well defined queuing rules.  This closed circuit is generally
isolated from the capital markets.  The Bauspar system was created in the 1920s based as
much on social as on economic and financial grounds. Although the first institution, the
Wustenrot, was a mutual  it converted to a  limited liability company two years after its19
founding.'5 Originally the Bausparkassen attempted to provide all the finance required by
homebuyers.  However,  this  proved  impossible  (particularly  in  an  inflationary
environment) and by  1938 the government officially stated that the main activity of the
Bausparkassen was to grant second mortgages. First mortgage funding was provided by a
network of mortgage banks (Hypothekenbanken) funding themselves on the capital markets
with mortgage bonds. During the 1  930s public Bausparkassen were organized to work with
a network of savings banks (Sparkassen).
28.  The  system  was revived  in  1948 after the  currency  reform.  It  developed
rapidly following the 1952 Dwelling House Construction Premium Act, the specific aim of
which was to encourage savings for owner-occupied housing.  Savers fulfilling the terms of
a contract (i.e., saving a target sum over a given period of time) received a government
interest premium equal to 25 to 35 percent of the amount saved (up to a set maximum).
This made Bauspar contracts attractive to savers as well as to potential home-buyers.
29.  The French system was inspired by the already established German system.
However, the original  closed French system was deliberately modified by  1970 into an
"'open" system aimed at creating a tranche of savers who would  be willing to leave their
savings  in the  CSH system  without exercising their  loan rights  because they  found the
yield on their savings attractive. The "free funds" so generated could be used by deposit
institutions to  fund other types of housing loans or invested in the new mortgage  bond
market.  An important  dimension of the French CSH system has been to stimulate long-
term savings by relying on housing as a strong saving motivation of households.  In the
directed credit environment of the postwar period, the long-term French capital markets
were  dominated  by  government  funding  requirements  and  segmented.  The  CSH
mechanisms  were modified  and  "opened"  to  address the need for  additional  long-term
financial savings.
30.  The  creation  of the  E-L  system  was  part  of  a  comprehensive  package  of
housing  finance  reforms  implemented  in  1965  and  1966.  These  reforms  aimed  to
encourage savings, develop market-based long-term finance and put an end to central bank
rediscounting  of  long-term  housing  loans  which  had  marked  much  of  the  immediate
postwar period.  Because CSH instruments are by design meant for equity building and
second loan, a mortgage bond market was created at the same time (Marche Hypotecaire)
to develop the supply of long-term principal mortgages.
1  5  Boleat  [1985].20
31.  The history of the French  E-L system is worth outlining briefly as it throws
light on the system in force today.  There were three periods marked by the introduction of
different  instruments which coexist until today:
*  1952-1965: a period of experimentation with  private mutual  savings organizations
(credit  differe)  which proved  unstable and did  not  appear capable of  meeting the
financing needs of the sector.  However, several of these mutual finance companies
are still in operations  within the small segment of specialist housing lenders.
*  1965-to date: The E-L system is created with  the "compte d'4pargne-logement"  or
CEL contract.  It  is an  instrument with terms  very similar  to the  German Bauspar
contract  in  term  of  length  of  saving  phase  (minimum  of  18  months),  low  loan
multiplier (1.5), and low deposit and lending rates.  However, this instrument did not
succeed very well due to the shortage of funds for principal mortgage loans to go with
the  E-L loans. This  in spite of the  creation of the  mortgage bond market  (Marche
Hypotecaire) nine months later.  All deposit banks can issue CEL contracts.
*  1970- to date: A new type of contract is introduced: the "plan d'ipargne-logement"  or
PEL contract.  This PEL contract differs in several ways from the CEL contract. Its
loan multiplier is larger (2.5 times).  Its savings period is much longer (originally 4
years, extended to 5 years during problems years in the 1980s, then back to 4 years in
1993). Most importantly, the original pool of PEL contracts enjoyed a deposit rate of
8% which was competitive with  after tax yields on long-term treasury bonds.  This
deposit rate had two parts: a basic deposit rate of 4% funded by the deposit bank plus a
substantial  interest rate premium of 4%  funded by the government.  Thanks  to  the
government premium the lending rate was 5.5% refelcting  an original spread of 1.5%
(now 1.7%) over the banks' deposit rate.
32.  The rationale  followed by  the  French  financial authorities  for  the  interest
premium was that it is more efficient for the economy to use scarce budget resources to
stimulate  private  savings  than  to  subsidize  either  production  schemes  or  household
expenditures.  Until the reform, a significant amount of subsidies went to mortgage loans
or producer loans.  Due to the lagged structure of CSH,  public funds could be leveraged
since in any  one year the  interest premia  actually disbursed by the budget would be  a
fraction of the savings actually mobilized (interest subsidies are paid upon completion of
the contract).  Over time this leveraging of budget funds was increased in two ways. First,21
the interest premium was lowered to 2/7 of the interest earned from 1/2 in 1970.  Second
and more subtly, with the extension of the number of years following the savings phase
during which  the option  to a loan could be exercised savers had an incentive to leave their
funds into the system for extended periods thereby acting as "bons  freres" and  funding
other's  loans.  The PEL  contract has proven remarkably  successful and  dominates  the
French E-L system today.  It has produced a very large pool of long term savings available
to fund the mortgage bond market and a variety of housing-related purposes, not just CSH
loans.
33.  Finance  Ministry  authorities have kept  CSH  deposit rates competitive  with
alternative savings vehicles  in order to  expand the savings pool and attract many  non-
borrowing savers ("les bon freres"  or  good brothers mentioned above).  The PEL based
system  is therefore an open system.  Because these funds support a variety of lending
purposes and  loans are available immediately after completion of the minimum savings
period, they are issued by general banking institutions with extensive branch networks and
alternative funding capabilities.
3.4 Interest  Rate Selection
34.  As Table 5 shows, the French and German CSH differ substantially in their
specific  characteristics  and options. However,  from a financial  management  viewpoint,  the
main differences are in the determination  of interest rates, the loan multiplier, and the
timing of loan availability.
*  Reflecting the strong price stability in Germany over decade, the Bauspar program
features a constant, fixed, below-market rate on savings generally between 2.5% and
4%. Each financial  institution  has a choice in selecting  its contract  rate, but rates are
very close.' 6 The loan rate is fixed at a constant spread of 2 percentage  points over
the savings  rate.
*  The Epargne-Logement  (E-L) features savings rates that are set to be competitive  on
an after-tax  basis (interest  is tax free)  with other financial  assets. The loan rate is fixed
as a spread over the savings rate at the time the contract is initiated. These interest
rates are regulated  by the Ministry  of Finance and have  been adjusted  over time. Pools
16  In very recent years, some Bausparkassen have issued contracts  at higher  rates  of 5% and 6%.
See FINANZtest, May,  1994,  page 19.22
of contracts with  different interest and even maturity characteristics issued on different
years can co-exist.  Due to  the  lead time between contract and loan, the loan rate
could theoretically be above or below market by the time the saver becomes eligible for
a loan, immediately after completion of the minimum savings period which has been
either 4 or 5 years.  In practice, the interest on E-L loans has been at least 400 basis
points below mortgage rates on the secondary mortgage market (marche hypothecaire).
3.5  "Loan Multipliers" and "Interest Multipliers"
35.  The loan multiplier is an abbreviated name for the ratio between the loan
amount  that  can be  obtained  for a  given amount saving  contracted.  In the  German
Bauspar system the loan multiplier is  1.5.  It is calculated directly as a multiple of the
amount saved.
36.  Due  to  inflation  rates  in  France  at  that  time,  the  "loan  multiplier"  was
replaced by an "interest multiplier".  The calculation of the multiplier was changed to
take into account the pattern of saving installments over the life of the contract.  Those
who save a lot early accumulate more interest.  On the other hand they are penalized more
by inflation.  Therefore it was decided that it would be more efficient and more fair to use
an "interest multiplier" applied to the amount of interest earned during the saving phase
of the contract.  This removes the linear relation between the size of the savings account
at contract maturity and the maximum loan amount.  When she borrows, the saver faces
a trade-off between the amount of the loan and the loan maturity bounded by the total
interest amount  eamed.  The  "interest multiplier"  for the CEL was kept at  1.5 as in
German contracts because the contract initially had a short savings period of 18 months.
While more flexible the CEL contract can be used only for repairs.  On the other hand,
the interest multiplier was raised to 2.5 for PEL contracts which initially had a savings
period of 4 years.
3.6  Waiting Periods for the CSH Loan and "Interim" Loans
37.  In Germany, there is an uncertain waiting period after achieving the savings
target before loan funds are made available.  Loans are rationed by a complex allocation
process designed to ensure that new loans can be funded out of the institution's current
cash  flow  (new  savings  plus  loan  repayments).  The minimum  savings  period  for  a
Bauspar contract is theoretically much shorter than that of an E-L contract, but in practice23
it is a function of the size and term of the contract and typically involves a 3 to 4 year
waiting period.
38.  In the "closed" German system, savers may have to wait beyond the maturity
date of their contract. Therefore a saver has been given the possibility to borrow the CSH
loan amount at market (or near market) rates of interest prior to the award of the loan.
These "interim" loans are then repaid with the proceeds of the CSH loan.  Interim loans are
funded by Bausparkassen outside the CSH system (i.e., through deposits or lines of credit
from other financial institutions).  There are no interim loans in the French CSH system
because, by law, borrowers qualify immediately for a loan by the end of  the saving period
of their  contract.
3.7  Financing of the Principal  Mortgage Loan
39.  A  CSH  is  designed  to  help  savers  build  up  their  equity  and  to  fund
complementary  loans.  Neither  French or German CSH system  is designed as  the sole
source of housing funds.'7 Borrowers typically  augment their contract loans with loans
from  other sources of credit.  A first  mortgage  covers the difference between  the unit
purchase price and the contract sum.
I  In Germany, borrowers obtain first mortgages either on a fixed-interest basis through
mortgage banks or a variable-interest basis through savings banks. Most of the private
Bausparkassen  are  part  of  financial  groups  consisting  of  a  commercial  bank  and
mortgage  bank (Hypothekenbank).  Likewise, the public  Bausparkassen are part of
groups headed by a regional clearing bank (Landesbank), savings banks (Sparbanken)
and  mortgage  bank.  As  a  result, one-stop  housing  loan consolidating  the  various
sources of funds has become the practice in the German housing finance market.
17  Excess  liquidity in CSH contract systems  in the early years of development  when more contracts  are
signed than loans made should not delude policy makers into believing that a CSH system can be self-
sufficient  and fund all housing finance  needs. The assumption  that a CSH system could finance  the housing
sector by itself  was the fundamental  conceptual  flaw  of the Tunisian  housing  finance system  run under CNEL
(Caisse National  d'Epargne Logement).  The Tunisians  housing finance system had to be restructured
extensively  in the late 1980s. The CNEL  state institution  was converted  into a specialist  (state)  housing  bank
(Banque de I' Habitat) with the same broad powers as the eleven other deposit banks of Tunisia.  BH has
complemented  its CSH funds with domestic  (tax based)  long-term  funds and foreign  loans from development
lenders.24
In  France,  both  commercial banks,  savings  banks  and  specialized  lenders  provide
mortgage credit on both a fixed and variable rate basis.  Funding of these primary loans
often  comes  from the  E-L  "free"  funds not  required  for  making  E-L  loans.  E-L
liquidities can otherwise be invested in the mortgage bond market.'8
3.8  Large-Scale  Success of the Two Systems
40.  The long-term success of the French system can be seen in Figure 2  and for
Germany in Figure 3. Both systems grew during the 1980s,  with the French system expanding
at a much faster rate.  By the end of 1992, there were 19.5 million E-L accounts outstanding,
more than one for every three French citizens. E-L deposits amounted to FF611 billion while
total demand deposits in the banking system amounted to FF1,386 billion, and time deposits to
FF2,601 billion. PEL contracts represent 80% of all E-L deposits, and CEL  contracts only
20%.  The growth in E-L deposits has slowed markedly since 1989, and CEL  deposits have
remained almost at the same level since 1982. This slowing down reflects several converging
factors: the maturity of the system reflected in its very high rate of diffusion, the development
of attractive saving alternatives (particularly the SICAV monetaires or money market mutual
funds), a continuous decline in the demand for new housing since 1975, and to a lesser extent
the relative decline  in the  value of  government interest premia (subsidies), all  of  these
coinciding with a period of very low inflation. In recent years, E-L loans have represented 22-
25% of all new housing loans made each year.  Given their shorter term, outstanding E-L
loans represent 12.5%  of all housing loans (FF250 out of 2,017 billion). Since its creation the
aggregate uses of funds have been:
- 28.2% for new housing,
-44.9% to finance the purchase  of existing housing
-26.8% to finance repairs and improvements.
The combined direct and indirect contribution of the open French CSH system to financing
housing is much larger than direct CSH loans because E-L funds can be used to finance other
forms of housing investment.
18  This  E-L  liquidity  or "fonds  libres"  is often  mistaken  described  in English  as "treasury"  because  it
is reported  by the  Ministry  of Finance  as "Tresorerie".  This  data is in fact  a stock  and  not a flow  since  it is
measured  by the  difference  between  outstanding  savings  deposits  and  outstanding  loans.25
41.  The  diffusion of  the  Bauspar  system  throughout the  population  is  equally
impressive in Germany where there are 21 million holders of contract, a important fraction
with more than one contract.  This represents 35% of the population in western Germnany.  By
the end of 1993, there were DM 144 billion in outstanding savings (including accrued interest)
compared with DM 1,617 billion of non CSH deposits in the banking system (8.2%).  There
were DM 100 billion in contract savings loans compared to DM 640 billion in first mortgage
loans  (13.5%)  and  DM  1.08  trillion  of  total  non-Bauspar  housing  loans  (8.5%).
Approximately  60  percent  of  all  housing  transactions  have  partial  finance  from  a
Bausparkasse.  New deposits in  1993  amounted to  DM 37.6 billion.  New  loans were
approximately DM 23 billion compared with DM 60 billion in first mortgages and DM 95
billion in total new non-Bauspar housing loans.  As in the French case, large share of new
originations relative to outstanding loans reflects the faster amortization of Bauspar loans.
42.  The Bausparkassen registered a decline in new savings growth during the mid-
1980s, reflecting a cut-back in tax incentives and less advantageous relative loan rates (Figure
3). Savings contract balances have increased significantly since 1989, reflecting the expansion
of the Bausparkassen into the former German Democratic Republic.  As will be seen below,
the relative attractiveness of Bauspar loans has also increased as market interest rates have
risen. The use of interim loans has been growing with DM 50 billion outstanding at the end of
199326
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IV.  THE  HOUSEHOLD  PERSPECTIVE
4.1  Basic CSH Design Considerations
43.  Why would  a  household  enter  into a  savings contract for  housing?  What
factors affect the potential demand for this type of financial contract?  To be attractive, a
CSH should provide credit that is cheaper on an all-in basis than alternative sources and/or
provides features that are absent from  competing alternatives.  The cost of  a CSH to  a
household  depends  on  the  value  of  a  complex  set  of  loan,  savings  and  subsidy
characteristics, as well as non-housing options if available.'9 The analysis must take into
account the following factors:
i  The value of the below market loan which depends on the difference between the fixed
rate on contract loan versus the expected future rate on a conventional mortgage.  This
loan will be available at some future date depending on the contract (i.e., whether there is
a waiting period) and the dynamics of the scheme (i.e., the evolution of deposits).  The
value to the household of this advantage can be expressed as the present value of the
interest savings between the contract loan and expected market mortgage rate over the
term of the loan. 20
*  The value of the interim loan (if offered).  Borrowers who qualify for a contract saving
loan may have to wait some period to obtain funds (if funds are dependent on the inflow
of new savings and a waiting period is used to ration credit). An interim loan, made at or
near market short term rates may be offered to bridge the period between completion and
receipt of funds.  This loan allows the household to purchase or renovate a house earlier
19  The analysis presented in this section is a required  starting point for any CSH instrument  whether
closed or open. It is not substantially  altered by the existence  of various  options such as those present  in the
open French  PEL contracts. Exercise  of these  options by savers  will vary  according  to market  conditions  and
family  circumstances.  The possible  instability  of CSH systems  which may result from household  decisions  is
discussed  when  evaluating  a CSH system  from  the financial  institution  and the govemment  perspectives.
20  The loan maturity affects this calculation. CSH loans frequently  have more rapid amortization  than
conventional  mortgages  in order to increase  reflows  of funds to meet new lender  commitments. Also, CHS
loans operate as second mortgage  loans.  Thus, the relevant comparision  is with a larger first mortgage  or
larger  equity  investment.28
and reduces the opportunity cost of below market rate savings.  This alternative may be
important to households in an inflationary environment.
*  The opportunity cost of below market rate savings reduces the value of the CSH to the
household.  The magnitude of this cost depends on the rate on the contract versus market
rates  for comparable maturity  savings  accounts.  This  cost  can be  expressed  as  the
present value of the lost interest savings over the savings period.
*  The final financial element of value is the subsidy. The subsidy may be in the form of
tax  preferences  for  savings  (e.g.,  tax  free  interest  or  tax  credits)  and/or  matching
payments made by the government for individual accounts (bonuses).  Subsidies increase
the attractiveness of  CSH by offsetting part of the opportunity cost of below  market
savings.
44.  In deciding whether to participate in a CSH, the household is assumed to select the
alternative that minimizes the cost of capital for home ownership. 21 The borrower chooses
a CSH contract in which he/she saves part of the contract amount and receives a loan for
the balance, the annualized borrowing rate on a CSH loan can be expressed as: 22
(1)  rL = LrC +IrI +S [rS  rD]
where:
rL = CSH effective loan rate
rC = CSH contract loan rate
r=  Intermediate loan rate  where applicable
rS= market rate of savings (expected after-tax yield to maturity)
rD  CSH deposit rate (after-tax) plus government bonus (if applicable)
and
L + I + S= 1
21  A more involved  decision-making  model would  involve  maximization  of the present  value of utility
from consumption  of housing  and  other  goods over a given time  period  subject  to an intertemporal  budget
constraint  and  various  financial  and liquidity  constraints,  see for instance  Alm, Follain  and  Beeman  [1985].
By specifying  a rate  of time  preference,  the  cost of waiting  (in  terms  of foregone  utility  from  home  ownership)
can  be included.
22  Equation  I expresses  the value  of a CSH  in terms  of the effective  loan  rate. Alternatively,  the  present
value  of interest  savings  on  the loan  can  be added  to the  savings  rate  to determine  all-in  return  on savings.29
L=  Contract loan amount
I = Interim loan amount
S= Contract savings amount
45.  In order to put everything on a comparable basis, rL is calculated as the internal rate
of return  over the entire  savings and  loan period. 23 Abstracting  from the value of the
guaranteed loan option, the household would select the CSH if the all-in borrowing rate
(rL) is lower than the cost of alternative sources of finance. 24
4.2  German "Closed" Contract
46.  The evolution of the components of all-in Bauspar yield from  1982 to  1991 are
shown in Figure 4.  The Bauspar loan advantage (shown as a negative spread) declined
steadily for the first 5 years of the period but widened in recent years as market rates have
increased.  The opportunity cost of savings has been almost a mirror image to the loan
advantage, falling as market rates fell in the early and mid 1980s and increasing recently.
The top line in the graph shows the steady decline in the interest subsidy.
47.  The all-in borrowing rate from equation I (Bausrate) is shown along with a 10 year
fixed interest mortgage loan in Figure 4.  The Bausrate was considerably below the 10 year
market mortgage rate during the early 1980s and the early 1990s. Not surprisingly, these
periods have been ones with strong growth in savings (Figure 3).  During the mid-1980s,
there was virtually no yield advantage to a Bauspar loan. As can be in Figure 3 showing
the dynamics  of  the  Bauspar  system,  this  period corresponded with  a  decline  in  new
savings contracts.  In their micro-analysis of household use of Bauspar savings, Supan and
Stahl (1991) also found the quantity of savings to  be responsive to the relative after-tax
return.  During this period, the stock of savings contracts declined.  The recent revival of
the system reflects the rising relative attractiveness.  The stability of the all-in loan rate is
noteworthy.
23  The spreadsheet  analysis used to calculate  this IRR and analyze  the impact  of inflation  on CSH is
explained  in the appendix].
24  Alternative  sources  of finance  may  be debt  or equity. If debt,  the  relevant  comparison  may  be either  a
higher LTV first mortgage  or a market  rate second  mortgage. If only variable rate debt finance is available,
the relevant  comparable  is the expected  cost. If debt  finance  is unavailable  the alternative  is equity  finance,
with  an opportunity  cost  of foregone  interest  on  market  rate  savings.30
Figure 4
Bauspar  Loan Advantage,  Opportunity  Cost of Savings and Subsidy




4.  40  --  ---
2  2.00 
>,  2.00_  .
-2.00  I 11  1  1  1  1  1  1
-4.00A'  '
CD  '-  CD  C0  0  LO  4  r-  N  a  ._D  .-  CD  C
|  _  . Loan_Adv  - Opport  .---  Subsidy
Figure 5
Bauspar  All-in Loan Rate
11.00  T
10.00
7  8.00  Mort  10 Year




c^L  a  1
-~~  <~~LL  0  z  co
Source:  Authors' Calculations
4.3  French  "Open"  Contract31
48.  The analysis in this  section refers to the Plan d'Epargne-Logement  (PEL) which
dominates the E-L system with 80 percent of the outstanding deposits.  The success of the
PEL comes from its very attractive yields during the savings phase.  For most years the
tax-free savings rates on contracts has been very-  close to the after-tax yield on government
bonds,  usually  above  it  during  the  1970s when  housing  output  and  the  demand  for
mortgage finance was strong (dark bar in Figure 6).  The deposit is somewhat liquid in that
the contract holder is entitled to closing its account at maturity and collect the government
savings bonus even if no housing loan is taken out. For the borrowing phase, E-L loan rates
have fluctuated at levels between 40 and 60 percent of the mortgage bond rates on the
Marche Hypothecaire (represented as a negative spread in the light bars in Figure 6).  The
connection between E-L relative cost and system performance is not  as direct  as in the
German case because of the influence of (de)regulation and inflation.  During the early
1980s, nominal  interest  rates were  high  leading to  a  reduction  in  the  growth of  new
deposits and an expansion in loan originations.  The resulting reduction in the tresorerie led
officials to increase the minimum savings period.  Deposit growth rebounded strongly in
the mid-1980s as inflation moderated but fell after 1989 reflecting increased competition
from  money  market  accounts  offered  to  households  following  financial  market
deregulation and attractive after-tax yields.
Figure 6
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49.  The design of the French contract accounts for this variability  in both  loan and
deposit  growth.  Holders of accounts opened when the deposit rates are relatively  high
have an  incentive to deposit the maximum amount of savings and not take  out a  loan.
Those who  start accounts when  rates are relatively  low have an incentive to  close the
account or take out a loan promptly after five years if rates rise.  Also, households can open
multiple accounts through family members in the French system.  As already reported with
the description of the contract options in Table 1, these contracts can be consolidated into
one operation after the minimum waiting period. This option interjects a greater degree of
volatility in the volume of savings and exercise of loan rights. 25
4.4  The Attractiveness of CSH Features
50.  Factors other than relative cost may affect household decisions to enter into CSH.
The guarantee of a loan with  favorable terms for the purchase or renovation of a house
upon completion of the savings contract is one of the principal features of a CSH.  The
guarantee is an option as the household is not obligated to take the loan.  This option is
particularly valuable to those households with some doubt about their ability to qualify for
a market rate loan in the future (e.g., lower income or self-employed households). 26 Also,
the  CSH  allows  borrowers  to  demonstrate  their  credit  worthiness  through  consistent
savings behavior, an important feature if they lack a credit history.  A savings contract may
be appealing to  some households because of its "forced" or targeted nature. 27 Also, the
earmarking of  funds for  housing  through  specialized  institutions may  be  appealing  to
households  vith limited experience with or mistrust of existing financial institutions.
51.  The  CSH  systems  developed  at  a  time  in  which  many  households  had  limited
mortgage borrowing alternatives.  The guarantee of loan availability is attractive in and of
25  We have not attempted  to evaluate  the user cost of housing capital  in relation  to the peaks and
troughs of the demand  for E-L loans. This  would require  a separate  research  task. A particular  concern  is the
possible  existence  of procyclical  interactions  which  might  increase  the  instability  of  the E-L  system.
26  Numerical valuation of this option would be very complex. The value of an option  to obtain  a
mortgage  loan with known  terms sometime  after fulfillment  of the savings  contract  depends  on the likelihood
of qualification. Given pre-specified  qualification  (e.g., payment-to-income)  rules the probability  of future
(market) loan approval  depends  on financial  characteristics  (e.g., market interest  rates at the time of funding)
and household  characteristics  (e.g., borrower  income).
27  This incentive  was emphasized by Guttentag [1975]. CSH are a form of goal oriented  savings (the
"goal"  being accumulation  of the downpayment  and  the "reward"  being the availability  of the loan).33
itself but  the  availability  of  CSH  funds were  often  required by  first  mortgage  lenders.
However, the uniqueness of the CSH contracts has faded with the development of savings
and loan alternatives through the private market, and the increased competition in the supply
of mortgage  funds.  The government subsidy for savings  is arguably the only  remaining
unique characteristic. As a result, the future growth of these systems may be determined
more by their relative price (incorporating subsidies) than their specific features.
V.  THE INSTITUTION'S PERSPECTIVE
52.  In  Germany, Bauspar  contracts  are offered  by  fully specialized  institutions  the
Bausparkassen: 21 private ones, of which all but three are owned by commercial banks,
and 13 public ones owned by the regional central banks or Landesbanken).  In France, E-L
contracts  can be  offered by  any deposit institution as part of a  diversified portfolio  of
activities.  80.4  percent of the  savings are with  the dominant  commercial banks,  14.3
percent  with the private savings banks (Reseau Ecureuii), 5.3 percent with the branches of
the public savings bank (Caisse Nationale D'Epargne).
5.1  German  CSH System: Specialized Lenders
53.  Conceptually,  a  CSH  provider  is  no  different  than  other  types  of  financial
institutions.  It mobilizes funds and makes loans.  Its sources and uses of funds depend on
whether it is a specialized institution or a generalized credit provider.  The Bausparkassen
are specialized  institutions.  They obtain funds from savings contracts,  cash flow  from
assets  (i.e.,  interest  and  loan  amortization)  and  other  borrowed  funds  (mainly  bank
deposits).  They  invest in  CSH  loans,  interim  loans,  government  securities  and  bank
deposits.  The aggregate balance sheet for the Bausparkassen in 1992 is shown in Table 6.
Note that 81 percent of the assets are CSH related loans and 73 percent of the liabilities are
CSH contracts.  The aggregate capital ratio was 5.3 percent.34
Table 6
German Bausparkassen:  Aggregate Balance Sheet, 1992
Assets  DM Million  Liabilities  DM Million
Contract Loans  98,276  Contract Deposits  137,598
Interim Loans  44,382  Other Deposits  5,572
Other Building Loans  8,903  Deposits of Credit  26,207
Institutions
Cash and Bank Deposits  13,981  Bonds  1,420
Securities  23,435  Other  12,801
Other  3,346  Capital  8,725
Total  192,323  192,323
Source:  Deutsche Bundesbank
5.2 French CSH System:  Non-Specialized Lenders
54.  In France, there is no published, consolidated balance sheet covering all E-L
providers.  CSH loans are one of many assets of French banks and CSH deposits are one of
a  number  of  liabilities.  Like  in  Germany, the  system  is  entirely  administered  with
continuity by financial regulators who in addition to providing the basic framework of the
system and decide on the value of each of its individual parameters. 28 It is therefore upon
the  authorities  rather  than  the  individual  banks  themselves  that  rest  the  financial
equilibrium of the system.  Excess liquidities deriving from CSH deposits can be used to
fund a  number  of different  types  of housing  investments,  most  prominently  PC  loans
(regulated mortgage loans) and the mortgage bond market (CRH bonds).  Conversely, if
at any time there were insufficient CSH funds to meet CSH funding requirements  such
loans would have to be funded by the deposit institutions from other sources.
28  In Germany,  Bausparkassen  are regulated  by the Federal  Banking  Supervisory  Office. In France,
a long-established  regulatory unit in the Treasury is responsible  for monitoring  other forms of savings
including  insurance  and  pension funds and their impact  on financial  markets:  Bureau B-3, Sous-Direction
B: Epargne,  Prevoyance,  et Marche  Financier. Service  des  affaires  monetaires  etfinancieres.  Direction  du
Tresor.  Ministere  de l 'Economie  et des  Finances.35
5.3  Financial  Risks of CSH Systems
55.  Lenders are attracted to CSH as a  way to mobilize long term funds primarily to
meet  the  mortgage  loan  demand  of  their  clients.  Ultimately  lending  institutions  will
provide CSH programs if they generate sufficiently high risk-adjusted returns on equity. 29
The returns from CSH as well as the risks they present depend on the characteristics of the
program,  the  lending  institution  and  the  macroeconomic  environment.  As  financial
institutions,  CSH  providers must  manage  financial risks of their portfolios.  The three
major financial risks are  liquidity,  interest rate and credit risk.
5.3.1  Liquidity Risk
56.  The principal risk for a specialized CSH lender is cash flow or liquidity risk.  The
possibility of a cash shortfall arises when the cash from new deposits and existing loan
payoffs is insufficient to fund loan commitments (i.e., loans to savers who have satisfied
their  savings  contracts).  Possible  imbalances  between  available  funds  and  loan
commitments  are regulated in the closed German Bauspar system  by a well publicized
point system, plus explicit negttiable  loan features trading off loan size and priority in the
queue.  In the more opaque environment of the open French E-L system, stability comes
from the liquidity provided by non-users (les bonsfirres),  and the powers of persuasion of
branch loan officers of deposit institutions.
57.  The magnitude of liquidity risk is determined by three factors.  The first factor is
the duration  of  the  loans  and  the  savings deposits.  To  be  affordable,  housing  loans
(particularly for purchase) must have relatively long maturities (e.g.,  15 years of more).
The longer the amortization period the smaller the periodic cash flow and the greater the
loan duration.  A lending institution may attempt to match the loan duration by attracting
non-borrowing savers and/or lengthening the minimum savings period. The second factor
is the loan-to-savings multiple. The larger the multiple, the greater the liquidity risk.  The
third factor is the nature of the loan commitment.  If the commitment is an option exercised
29  CSH are provided by both private and state-owned  institutions in both countries.  Although the
pricing of CSH is determined  by law, there is significant  non-price competition  and cross-selling  of other
financial products associated with their offering became increasingly  important  with the growth of retail
banking.36
by a qualified saver, the risk is greater than if the lender determines when the commitment
is funded.
i  Closed Bauspar System
58.  Because Bausparkassen are specialized institutions their dual solution to managing
liquidity risk is to allocate loan funds based on availability of savings deposits together
with a  low loan-to-savings multiple (between  I and  1.5).  The lending institution is not
obligated to fund the loan at any particular date.  Savers are informed that receipt of loan
funds is  dependent on  savings deposits.  Savers are typically  "prioritized",  with  those
savers with the largest regular deposits and those  borrowers selecting the  shortest  loan
maturities getting highest preference (i.e., are first in line to get a loan).  The "trick" to
operating  a  closed system is  attract sufficient new  savers to  minimize  the  wait period
inherent in such allocation formula, as a longer wait period reduces the attractiveness of the
CSH to  consumers.  The average wait period was  13.6 months  during  the  1980s. This
allocation  system  appears  to  have  worked  well  in  the  post-War  period.  However,
regulations have been revised to adapt to changing market circumstances.  The decline in
new contracts during the 1  980s led to the following changes:
*  Increased average wait time for savers to obtain funds (beyond the two year minimum
savings period before a loan can be obtained);
*  Requirement that Bausparkassen deposit the surplus accruing  from their  market-rate
(interim) lending to establish a reserve of 3 percent of savings deposits to  meet the
contract loan demand of qualified borrowers;
. Increased  ability  to  use  market  rate  financing  and  expanded  investment  security
authority.
ii.  Open Epargne-Logement System
59.  The French solution to maintaining cash flow stability is to encourage significant
numbers of non-borrowing savers.  To foster such behavior, the system must offer savings
yields close to or equal to non-CSH alternatives.  The closer the yield is to market the less
attractive such funds are to lending institutions (and the less attractive are the subsequent
loans).  The attractiveness of the E-L to lenders has been maintained primarily through the37
combination  of  tax-free  interest  and  savings  bonuses  provided  by  the  government
(allowing  them  to  attract  funds at  rates  significantly  below  market  in  pre-tax  terms).
Because E-L contracts are widely diffused through the banking system  instead of being
clearly localized in specialist institutions, liquidity risks are perceived to have a broader
potential  systemic  impact.  When  deposit  growth  fell  during  in  the  years  1980-1984,
contract maturities were extended from 4 to 5 years.
60.  In both systems, lending institutions have access to other sources of funds.  The
Bausparkassen have deposits from and lines of credit with other banks.  In France, general
banking  institutions  offer  CSH  and  can  finance  cash  shortfalls  from  diverse  internal
funding sources.
61.  The management and monitoring of liquidity is more transparent in the Bauspar
system.  If the Bausparkassen need outside funding, they must borrow funds from other
financial institutions.  The principal advantage of this  arrangement is that the funding is
likely to be arms  length and at market rates.  Such arrangements are a common way to
manage cash among financial institutions.  If used regularly and subject to periodic review
by the line of credit provider they need not signal undue difficulties.  However, extensive
use of non-contract borrowed funds can be a precursor to profitability problems.
62.  Because funding of CSH loans is part of general portfolios in diversified French
deposit  institutions,  the potential  for disguised  cross-subsidization is  significant. If  the
volume  of CSH  activity is large relative to the institution's  total balance sheet, system
maturation could lead to a profitability squeeze if funding at market rates were needed to
meet CSH loan demand.  But, conversely, if CSH contracts generate a significant amount
of excess funds, these could be used to fund other types of housing loans with potentially
disruptive competitive consequences for specialist lenders who fund themselves through
the  capital  markets  and  not  through  retail  deposits.  Such  an  episode  of  predatory
competition took place in the mid-1980s when the deposit banks intent on gaining market
share offered first mortgage loans at rates less than or equal to riskless government bond
yields.  They could only originate such underpriced loans with the use of below-market
CSH deposits. This predatory pricing behavior based on an opaque instrument coincided
with a major liberalization of the financial system in the late 1980s.  Analysts pointed out38
that the administered CSH system born in another era had become incompatible with full
market liberalization. 30
5.3.2  Interest Rate Risk
63.  Interest rate risk in the Bauspar system is limited by the contract design.  Rates on
both savings contracts and loans are fixed for the maturity of the contract and do not vary
with market  conditions.  Depending on the contract characteristics, the savings contract
rate will be between 2.5 and 4.5 percent.  Loan rates are set as a fixed 2 percentage point
spread to the savings rate.  Interest rate risk can arise through the characteristics of the
investment portfolio and other borrowings.  The magnitude and characteristics of both  is
limited by regulation.
64.  Interest rate risk is a greater concern in the open E-L system.  As  noted earlier,
administered  rates  on  various  contract pools  have  been  adjusted  according  to  market
conditions  at time,  and probable  scenarios on future interest  rates.  As  in  the German
system,  loan rates are set as a spread over the savings rate.  However, the potential  for
adverse selection is high with savers enjoying high contract rates maintaining their deposits
and not taking loans and savers with low contract rates minimizing their contributions and
immediately taking out below market rate loans. The introduction of non-contract funding
can also create interest rate risk.
5.3.3  Credit Risk
65.  The greatest attraction of CSH instruments lies in their ability to lower credit risk.  A
CSH provides a valuable signaling function  A successful contract saver has demonstrated
the ability to budget and set aside a portion of income for savings for an extended period
(many systems reward regular  savings as well as larger portions of income saved).  The
saver has "signaled" that he/she is a reliable borrower by revealing the self discipline and
motivation necessary to successfully complete a savings contract.  Thus, lending to CSH
savers may be less risky than lending to a random segment of the population.  In addition,
30  Following  the Basle agreement,  the move to risk-based  solvency ratios made the contradiction
between  the administered  CSH and competitive  and integrated markets even clearer.  With mispriced
mortgages,  deposit banks have not made use of the securitization  law of 1988 to securizatize  mortgages
and improve  their capital position.  The traditionally  decentralized  organization  of loan servicing  was also a
factor. With the highly competitive  financial  markets  of the 1990s,  all financial  intermediaries  are forced
to gradually  eliminate  obscure  adjustment  formulas  and cross-subsidies  between  products.39
the existence of a substantial downpayment obtained through contract savings reduces the
likelihood of default in the event of unforeseen circumstances impacting family income.
66.  The default  rates  on  CSH  loans  are quite low  according  to  French  and  German
lenders.  In France, delinquency and default rates for CSH housing loans are 1/10 that of any
other  type  of  housing  loan.  In  Germany, data  on  defaults  are  generally  unavailable.
However, discussions with industry representatives put annual default losses at less than 10
basis points.  It should be understood that overall default losses on all housing loans in both
countries are relatively low, reflecting conservative underwriting (low maximum loan-to-
value ratios) and relative house price stability.
67.  The attractiveness  of  CSH  to  financial  institutions  ultimately depends  on  the
characteristics of the program (in particular the rate spread) and their ability to manage
liquidity, interest rate and credit risk. The Bausparkassen have been reasonably profitable
in recent years. During the 1  980s their average return on assets (ROA) was approximately
35 basis points and their average return on equity (ROE) was 7.5 percent.3'  The ROA is a
bit higher and the ROE is a bit lower than comparable returns  for mortgage  banks and
commercial banks. Although the returns are modest,  the design of the program minimizes
potential liquidity and interest rate risk.  The Bauspar market remains quite competitive.
Although  the  decline  in  subsidies  has  reduced  the  growth  rate  in  savings  contracts,
participation rates remain high.  The purchase of the private Bausparkassen by commercial
banks over the past  15 years (part of their Allfinanz  strategy) is evidence to the on-going
viability  of the  system.  Commercial  strategies  and  opportunities  for cross-lending  of
consumer  loans  and  insurance  products  to  contract  savers  has  become  increasingly
important with the growing emphasis on the generation of fee income derived from the sale
of these products.
68.  In  France,  the profitability  of  CSH  lending  is  not  broken  out  on  the  income
statements of deposit banks.  There is a greater concern about the potential for liquidity and
interest rate risk in the CSH system.  These risks stem primarily from the contract design,
particularly  the  large  loan-to-savings  ratio,  the  immediate  eligibility  for  a  loan  after
completion  of  the savings  contract and  the ability  of households  to  take  out  multiple
contracts.  In addition, the interest rate subsidy has significantly distorted mortgage pricing
3IDeutsche  Bundesbank  [1990].40
at  the  margin  and  has  become  increasingly  inconsistent  with  the  liberalization  of  the
financial system.
VI.  THE  GOVERNMENT'S  PERSPECTIVE
69.  From the viewpoint of governments, the problem of CSH has been one of balancing
the benefits of (1) housing output expansion and (2) expected higher savings rates with three
immediate major concerns: (3) the cost of budget subsidies and/or contingent liabilities, (4)
the structural stability of the CSH system, (5) the potential distributive benefits of the system
in light of the public resources  involved.  A final consideration (6) is the consistency of CSH
systems with the development of market-based long-termn  finance and the liberalization of
financial markets in increasingly open economies.
6.1  Housing Output Expansion
70.  Output  expansion was  a  high  priority  in  both  Germany and  France during  the
postwar  period.  Housing  reconstruction in  Germany followed the urban  destruction  of
World War II.  In France, reconstruction also had to meet the very large stock adjustment
required by 30 years of rent control and the end of major urbanization.  In both countries,
initial rebuilding was accomplished through large scale public construction programs with a
significant emphasis on rental  accommodation. The German Bausparkassen  played a key
role in the mobilization of funds for owner-occupied housing.  The generous subsidy system
adopted  in  1952 resulted in  a  large increase in  savings and  eventually stimulated  home
mortgage lending.  The CSH system was a major part of the French housing finance reforms
of  1965 which  resulted  in an  elimination  of  shortages and  stabilization of  the price-to-
income ratio at or below a value of four within 10 years.
6.2  Higher Savings Rates
71.  As  a  vehicle for increasing  savings, CSH  appears to  have been  effective.  The
aggregate savings rate has been quite high in both France and Germany during the post-war
period. The gross savings rates in both France and Germany were in excess of 50 percent
higher than that  in the U.S.  during the period  1970 to  1985.32  Supan and  Stahl  have
provided evidence linking CSH and incremental savings rates for Germany.  They posit
32Carroll,  Rhee  and Rhee [  1994].41
that CSH is a form of dedicated savings. They find that both general and dedicated savings
are influenced by their rate of return and that these two forms of savings are imperfect
substitutes. Thus,  increasing  income has  stimulated both  types of  savings. Importantly,
they  find  that  a strongly significant relationship between loan originations  and  savings
deposits,  demonstrating  the  strong  incentive  of  the  promise  of  a  mortgage  loan  on
favorable terms.  This result is indirectly confirmed by Jappelli and Pagano [1994].  They
show that liquidity constraints on households, as measured by lower loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios on consumer and mortgage loans, are positively related to higher savings rates.  First
mortgage loans are offered at relatively low LTVs in both France and Germany (typically
less than 70 percent). As shown above, CSH savings are an attractive way to accumulate a
downpayment.  In  addition,  CSH  are  often  a  lender  prerequisite  to  obtaining  a  first
mortgage for first-time buyer.
72.  The  experience  of  both  systems suggests  that  government  subsidies  affect  the
characteristics  of  the participants as  well as  overall  use.  Supan  and  Stahl  found that
subsidization  increased participation rates among lower income households in  Germany
(both the tax credit and the bonus are capped by amount and the bonus is targeted to lower
and  moderate income households).  However, the effect of government subsidies on the
overall savings rate of these groups was small.
6.3  Size of Subsidies  and Government Contingent Liabilities
73.  A central concern of governments, particularly ministries of finance, is how best
to  deploy subsidies and tax expenditures related to housing and how to keep them low
enough not to impair macroeconomic management and price stability.  In France, it was
considered much better to restructure the housing budget to  subsidize CSH in order to
raise the household  savings rate (earmarked for housing) than dissipating scarce public
funds in subsidizing housing supply. In Germany, early emphasis on CSH subsidies for
owner-occupied housing suggests a similar approach.
74.  Concerns  with the  size of  subsidies to  CSH  can take  at least two  forms:  their
absolute and relative magnitudes and their potential for distortion.. We deal first with the
matter  of magnitude.  Comprehensive French national housing  economic and  financial
accounts  go  back to  1984.  They show  that the  French  CSH  system  has  grown very
significantly and represents a significant portion of government support for housing.  It is
important to note that tax expenditures rather than on-budget expenditures are behind the42
trend  Total E-L subsidies,  in 1990 were 9.45 billion representing 0.27% of GDP (Table 7).
This compares with on-budget total property and housing allowance subsidies in the year
of 70 billion or 0.78%  of GDP.33
Table 7:
FRANCE: Public Finance Impact of the CSH System (FF million)
Year  EL Subsidies  EL Share of  EL Tax  Total EL  EL Subsidies
I_____  paid out  Civil Budget  Expenditures  Subsidies  to GDP
1984  5,447  0.64%  3,700  9,147  0.21%
1985  3,400  0.37%  3,700  7,100  0.15%
1986  4,400  0.46%  3,550  7,950  0.16%
1987  4,700  0.49%  4,750  9,450  0.18%
1988  5,915  0.60%  5,250  11,165  0.20%
1989  9,077  0.87%  6,360  15,437  0.25%
1990  9,758  0.89%  7,600  17,358  0.27%
Source: Le Compte du Logement, 1984-1992. (Ministry of Equipment and  Housing, France.)
75.  We do not have complete data for Germany.  The interest subsidies paid to Bauspar
savers in 1991 were DM615 million, representing 0.14% of federal expenditures and only
0.06% of total government expenditures. The 1991 housing allowance expenditures were
DM 1.25 billion and 1990 combined federal and state social housing construction subsidies
were DM 8.5 billion (this amount represents a sharp increase over the mid-1980s levels of
DM 3  - 4  billion  reflecting  the  construction  needs  brought  on  by re-unification  and
immigration).  Total  tax expenditures  for owner-occupied  housing  in  1989 were  DM  9
billion.  These  estimates do  not  include  the tax  expenditure  associated  with  Bauspar
savings.  In Germany, however, most forms of deposit interest are tax free. These numbers
do indicate that the degree of CSH subsidization in Germany is less than that of France,
most likely reflecting the targeting of interest subsidies.
76.  Considerably more significant than the volume of subsidies themselves is the deep
impact that an open CSH system can have on the pricing of the much larger volume of
non-CSH  mortgage  loans,  and on  resource allocation  across  the financial  system.  As
reported earlier, because the CSH system has provided French deposit banks with low cost
33  Papa [1993].43
deposits,  they  have  originated  mortgage  loans  at  rates  below  the  riskless  yield  of
comparable government securities at several occasions during  the  1980s.  Such pricing
was prima facie  evidence of important distortions in a housing finance system that were
incompatible  with the  open  economy  and the  fully liberalized financial  system  of  the
1990s. In  addition,  the  fact  that  CSH  can only  be  offered  by  depositories  creates  a
distortion in their favor relative to specialized lenders which must fund themselves on the
capital markets.  The potential for distortion is far less with the Bauspar system because the
below market rate funds can only be used for making below-market rate second mortgages.
Although Bauspar can only be offered by specialized institutions, entry in the market is
possible (i.e., a British building society recently started a Bausparkasse in Hamburg) and
non-price competition is fierce.
6.4  Stability of CSH Systems
77.  The stability of CSH system can be viewed at two levels: (1) the structural stability
of a CSH system between deposits made and loans extended, and (2) the sustainability of a
CSH system as the financial sector deepens and is liberalized.  Both the German and the
French financial systems were heavily regulated when the CSH systems were implemented
and the systems today are still subject to tight regulation.  The primary regulatory concern
has been on the structural instability of the CSH system when it reaches maturity.  In their
early years CSH system have too much liquidity because many more contracts are signed
than  loans  granted.  When  the  system  reaches market  saturation  the  reverse  can  be
expected.
78.  The German closed contracts avoid structural instability through rigidity. The loan
multiplier  of  savings  made  is  kept  below  1.5 and,  loans  are made  only  if  funds  are
available. As noted above,  the ratio of loans under savings contracts to savings deposits
increased  from  74  percent  in  1978 to  87 percent  in  1987.  As  a  result,  a  number of
safeguards were implemented which had the effect of increasing the average waiting time
for savers to obtain funds. By the end of 1993 the ratio had fallen below 70 percent.
79.  The French open contracts are less rigid because the loan-savings multiplier is larger
and borrowers are entitled to a loan immediately upon completion of the savings contract.
The commonly cited requirement for long-term system stability in France is that the ratio
of  borrowers within  a  generation of  contracts does  not  go  above 40  percent  of  total
contracts.  An alternative measure of stability is used by the supervisory authorities. Their44
guideline  is that the profitability  of the system can be maintained  if  the liquidity ratio
(tresorerie), conventionally measured as the one minus the ratio of outstanding  loans-to-
outstanding deposits, can be kept around 40 percent.  The tresorerie dropped briefly below
40 percent during the early 1980s, creating a perceived liquidity crisis.  The government
extended contract maturities for new contracts from four to five years.  Banks also could
exercise  significant influence on their customers to convince them  to  delay  borrowing.
With the start of the 1990s the system has returned to stability primarilv due to the deep
decline in the demand for housing with new housing starts in  1993 falling to their lowest
level since 1954. Contract maturity has been brought back to four years in 1994.
80.  The long-term  structural problem now faced  by the open  French  system  is the
greater  difficulty  in  managing  it  in  the  new  environment  of  financial  liberalization.
Liquidity is less of a problem than the likelihood of distortion in a liberalized financial
system. The potential for distortion is not very significant in Germany because the system
is  closed.  Although  the  financial  system  in  Germany  has  not  undergone  a  major
liberalization such as occurred in France in the early 1990s, the closed nature of the system
greatly reduces the likelihood that below market rate savings from CSH could be used to
fund other types of lending.
6.5  Distributive Benefits of CSH systems
81.  Providing middle-income and low-income households access to financial services
is a prime rationale for creating CSH  systems.  Bauspar interest subsidies are expressly
targeted to low and middle income households.  The other major subsidy is a tax credit, the
value of which is not a function of the households income level. 34 E-L subsidies are not
explicitly targeted so as to  increase the attractiveness of the program to  non-borrowing
savers and to  reduce administrative costs.  E-L subsidies are weighted more  to  interest
income tax exemption.  With the increasing diffusion of income taxation, the marginal
benefits  of E-L tax exempt interest  inevitably benefits higher income groups more.  In
France, fifty-five percent of the direct loans went to upper-middle income groups and only
thirty-one percent to lower-middle income groups during the 1  980s.  Conceptually, the E-L
does provide benefits for households lower down the income scale to the extent that social
loans are financed with excess CSH liquidities.
34  This tax credit  is part  of a capped  overall  credit  for all provident  expenses. Most insurance
payments  are covered  by this  tax credit.  therefore  the possibility  to deduct  Bauspar  interest  depends  on
whether  the  sum  of all  provident-related  payments  has  reached  the  maximum  set in the  tax  law.45
82.  When it comes to  evaluating financial subsidies properly, the critical  dichotomy
between  housing  price  affordability  and  housing  finance  affordability  should  be  kept
clearly in mind. Subsidies to CSH systems can only lower the cost of finance, not the cost
of  housing.  When  the  level  of  the  housing  price-to-income  ratio  is  too  high,  say
significantly above  5,  a  large proportion  of  moderate and  low-income  households  are
excluded from access to housing ownership.  The penetration of benefits into lower income
groups in France was linked to both the liberalization of the finance system which induced
the banks to  expand their lending to lower income groups, but more importantly to  the
steady decline of PIR values.
6.6  CSH in Integrated Financial Markets: Winding Down Options
83.  With the rise of alternative savings and lending vehicles, the relative importance of
CSH is likely to decline. A major factor in their continued use will be the savings subsidies.
In Germany there has been a cutback in the subsidy, resulting in a decline in the quantitative
importance of the Bauspar contract but the participation rate remains very high.  In part this
can be attributed to the long history and solid reputation of the program. The fact that almost
all of the private Bausparkassen are owned by commercial banks attests to their importance
as a distribution outlet for a variety of banking and insurance products.  If consumer demand
wanes however, the internal structure of the contract will allow a spontaneous winding down
of the program.  In France, however, there appears to be a view that CSH continue to be seen
as an  effective  means to  stimulate the housing  sector.  In  1993, the CSH  contract was
modified and made more attractive as part of a larger housing stimulus package to reverse
the secular decline in new construction that began in 1975, with the number of new housing
units having fallen to its lowest level since 1954. The continued use of CSH as a sectoral
policy tool combined with its inherent opacity suggests that an open system like the  E-L
system could not be easily wound down in a short period of time.46
BOX  1:
CREDIT RISK  AND THE NATURE OF A DEBT CONTRACT *
There  are  frequent  popular  misconceptions regarding  debt  and  credit,  in  TSEs
which are just  emerging from a physically-oriented central planning environment where
construction was financed on a cash basis.  Among the most harnful  is the assumption
that debt is actually a commodity and borrowing like the purchase of any other good or
service  where  price  alone  equilibrates  supply  and  demand.  Unlike  most  market
transactions, debt cannot be easily summarized in simple terms of prices and quantities.
Debt is a highly complex contract.  It is a promise to repay principal and interest over a
significant period of time.  Its fulfillment is greatly affected by the institutional, legal, and
socio-economic environrent  in which it is made.  This promise has many dimensions:
*  Amount of funds advanced
*  Specification of interest, whether fixed or variable in relation to a benchmark rate
*  Specification of maturity, when the loan must be repaid
*  Collateral that the borrower must provide as security for the lender, if any
*  Specification of the circumstances in which the loan is in default giving the lender
the right to seize the borrower's assets (failure to pay interest and principal, breach of
covenant regarding borrower's expected behavior)
*  Specification of the law under which default is to be adjudicated
*  Specification of the seniority of the claim, i.e. where the lender stands in relation to
other creditors in case of default
*  Pledges in relation to further borrowings
*  Any further commitment by the lender to renew the loan
*  Provisions for transferability. Can the debt be freely sold to other holders?
Whether or not the contract is standardized in terns  of provisions and/or denomination
(to facilitate securitization)
*  Call provisions (whether the debt can be repaid early)
*  Any tax exemption features
This generic list of financial contract features suggests the benefits of a CSH in educating
TSE  populations about the nature of long-term financial contracts.
* Adapted from:  E. Philip Davis,  Debt, Financial Fragility and Systemic Risk  Oxford U. Press, 1992.47
VII.  CSH SUITABILITY TO TRANSITION ECONOMIES
7.1  Household Perspective and Inflation
84.  The attractiveness of CSH  to households in TSE  countries will depend on  the
features  and  the cost  of  the  savings  and  loan contracts.  From  a  cost  perspective, the
attractiveness  of  a  CSH  loan  depends  critically  on  the  inflation  and  interest  rate
environment.  Consider a stylized CSH contract modeled after the Bauspar model. 35 The
characteristics of this contract are shown in Table 8.
85.  To evaluate the attractiveness of a CSH contract in a TSE context, we compared the
all-in CSH loan yield with a market fixed rate loan alternative under various inflation and
interest rate scenarios.  The loan yield was calculated under three assumptions about the
wait period; no wait period  (the French model), a 24 month wait period,  and preflnding
the CSH loan with an interim loan at one percentage point under the market rate during the
wait period. In addition to calculating the all-in loan yield we also computed the payment-
to-income ratio and  loan-to-value ratio  assuming that the difference between the house
price and the CSH (savings plus loan) is funded with a market rate loan.
86.  The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 7.  The attractiveness of the
CSH clearly diminishes with  inflation. The all-in  loan yield  rises with  inflation and  is
greater than a comparable maturity fixed (market) loan rate when inflation is greater than
10 percent per  annum with  a wait period,  12 percent  per  annum if  an  interim loan is
available and 15 percent per annum if there is no wait period.
87.  The impact of  inflation on affordability also is striking. With a  fixed rate
structure the real value of accumulated savings and the affordability of housing (for a given
loan size) is eroded by inflation. Thus the portion of the purchase price that can be funded
with  a CSH loan falls sharply. In order to purchase the house, the portion funded by a
market rate loan rises accordingly.  As a result, the payment-to-income ratio rises sharply.
At a 10% inflation rate, the portion of the house price a CSH can fund is only 21 percent
35  This  model  can  be adapted  to the  E-L as well. The main differences  between  the  two models  from  the
household  perspective  are  a smaller  spread  between  market  and  contract  rates,  lack  of a mandatory  minimum
wait  period  for  a loan  after  completion  of the  savings  contract  and  a larger  loan  to savings  multiple.48
and the total payment-to-income ratio is 43 percent. Conversely, as the inflation falls, the
portion of the house price funded by a given CSH loan increases improving affordability. 36
As expected, the longer the wait period the less attractive the contract.
Table 8
Stylized CSH Contract  For a TSE
Feature  Value
Contract savings rate  5%
Contract loan rate  contract savings rate plus 2%
Loan payment to period one gross  28%
income  ratio
Savings to period one house price  40%
ratio
House price to income ratio  4:1
Loan to savings multiple  1:1
Market savings rate  inflation rate plus 2%
Government bonus  10% of annual savings
Contract loan term=market loan  240 months
term
Waiting  period  24 months
Market loan rate  inflation rate plus 5%
Interim loan rate  market loan rate-1%
Savings  balance  = downpayment
House price less CSH loan and
savings funded by market rate loan
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20.00%  1  /
10.00%
0.00% 
5.00%  10.00%  12.00%  15.00%  20.00%
Inflation  Rate
88.  The  attractiveness  of  the  CSH  to  the  household  can  be  improved  by
increasing the loan-savings multiple.  As shown in Table 9, an increase in L/S reduces the
all-in loan yield, as well as reliance on the market rate supplementary loan and thus the
total payment-to-income ratio.  The effects of going to a ratio of 1.5 are relatively modest,
however.  Affordability is still a problem if inflation is above  10 percent  and the all-in
yield  for  alternatives  involving  a  wait  period  are  higher  than  the  fixed  rate  market
alternative when inflation is greater than  15 percent.  An L/S of 2.5 (the French  model)
results in a more substantial increase in attractiveness, particularly in terms of cost (even
with the 24 month wait period the CSH  is a cheaper alternative at inflation rates greater
than  15 percent  per annum).  However, as discussed below, a L/S of 2.5 would lead to
serious liquidity problems for institutions offering CSH in an inflationary environment.50
Table  9 (see Figure  7)
Pressure to Increase the CSH Loan-Savings Multiple Under Inflation
L/S=1.5  L/S=2.5
Inflation  Inflation
5%  10%  12%  15%  5%  10%  12%  15%
Market loan  10.0%  15.0%  17.0%  20.0%  10.0%  15.0%  17.0%  20.0%
rate
CSH IRR: no  8.2%  12.5%  14.6%  18.2%  7.2%  9.5%  11.2%  14.4%
wait
CSH IRR, wait  8.8%  14.4%  17.2%  22.1%  7.5%  11.8%  14.4%  18.8%
CSH IRUR,  8.5%  13.3%  15.7%  19.9%  7.2%  10.8%  13.0%  16.7%
interim
CSH LTV  43%  31%  27%  22%  72%  51%  45%  37%
Market LTV  25%  46%  53%  61%  0%  25%  34%  46%
Pay/Income  28%  41%  47%  58%  24%  35%  41%  51%
LIS:  Loan to savings  multiple  specified  in  the contract
89.  This  analysis  suggests that  a  CSH  will  not  be  particularly  attractive to
households  in  TSEs  from a  relative  cost  or  affordability  perspective. 37 However,  the
guarantee of a  loan for which the household doesn't  have to qualify at time  of contract
completion may have significant value in a TSE. A CSH allows borrowers to demonstrate
their credit worthiness through consistent savings behavior which may substitute for the
lack of credit history.  Furthermore, long-term fixed rate market alternatives do not exist at
present. Thus, relative to a short-term fixed rate loan which would have to refinanced at an
uncertain future rate, or a variable rate loan, the CSH loan may appear to be attractive to
the household.  However, the problem remains that  in an inflationary environment, the
household would have to use these sources of credit as well to purchase a house (reflecting
the fall in the CSH LTV with inflation).
37  An alternative to a fixed rate instrument  in an inflationary  environment  is an indexed contract. An
indexed  savings  contract  would significantly  reduce the impact  of inflation  on the affordability  of CSH loans
by reducing  the need for alternative  credit. However,  the potential  negative amortization  on the loans would
greatly  exacerbate  the liquidity  risk  to providers.51
7.2  Institution Perspective and Lack of Banks
90.  CSH are appealing to lending institutions in TSEs as a vehicle to mobilize
long  term  funds  for housing.  But  can  lenders earn  acceptable  returns  offering  such
products? As in developed countries, the answer depends on the ability to manage the risks
inherent in CSH.
91.  Liquidity risk  is a  greater concern in  TSEs than  in developed  countries,
reflecting the liquidity preference of the population and the lack of funding alternatives.
The  French  model  in  which  loan and  savings rates  move  in  response  to  the  market,
borrowers  can  obtain  loan  funds immediately  upon  contract  completion,  and  loan-to-
savings ratios are high pose a great deal of liquidity risk to providers.  Moreover, offering
of  CSH  through  general  banking  institutions  could be  disruptive to  newly  developing
financial markets if the (below-market rate) funds were used for other lending purposes in
the early years of the program.
92.  Liquidity risk is easier to manage and monitor in  the German model.  A
closed system in which the lender determines when loans are funded can be an effective
method  of  managing  liquidity  risk.  The  principal  danger  may  be  in  dealing  with
discouragement  that  may  set  in  when  depositors  realize  that  housing  purchase  or
construction  may  still  be  unaffordable.  Because  the  behavior  of  depositors  in  TSE
countries is likely to be less predictable than in developed countries, it will be important
for CSH providers to establish lines of credit with other financial institutions to assist in
liquidity risk management. 38
93.  Interest rate risk can be a significant problem  for institutions using  fixed
rate instruments in an inflationary environment.  Again the German model would be more
appropriate for a  TSE as it minimizes the potential interest rate risk from CSH  specific
activities.
38  CSH providers  modeling  after the Bausparkassen  have been established  in the Czech  Republic  and the
Slovak  Republic. The only authorized  source of funds for these institutions  other than capital and contract
savings  contracts  is from bond issues. The ability of these institutions  to issue bonds is questionable. Bond
markets are undeveloped  in these countries  and an attempted  issue by one of these institutions  would most
likely  signal  that it was having  a liquidity  problem.52
94.  The signaling feature of CSH is valuable in managing credit risk in the TSE
context.  In developed financial systems, the two key underwriting tools are payment-to-
income ratios and loan-to-value ratios.  In TSEs there usually is little or no data to assess
expected borrower repayment performance and income reporting is usually questionable.
Property  values may be difficult to determine, undermining the use of the loan-to-value
ratio as an underwriting tool against default risk.  A CSH allows borrowers to establish a
credit record reducing the emphasis placed on collateral valuation and loan-to-value ratios.
95.  Some countries are considering the use of indexed contracts to  deal with
the problem of inflation.  Several directions are possible.  The easiest and most obvious
one is to index both deposit and lending rates to a short-term treasury rate of reference,
with a negative margin from that reference rate for the deposit rate and a small positive
margin for the lending rate; see for instance Dufoix (1989).  In Poland, more complex
contracts  patterned  after the  dual-indexed (DIM)  mortgage  instrument  are  apparently
under consideration. 39 The administrative complexity and commercial attractiveness of
such indexed CSH products remains as yet entirely untested.  It should be noted that the
VRM  solution  destroys  the  principal  attractiveness  of  CSH  to  households  --  fixed
predetermined  rates of interests.  The DIM solution exacerbates the liquidity risk of a
CSH.
7.3  Government Priorities on Housing and Financial Sector Integration
96.  Should TSE  governments encourage the formation  of CSH  systems?  In
developed countries, the creation of specialized systems apart from the broader financial
markets  is not  consistent  with  the  trend  towards  integration  of  financial  markets  and
increased reliance on market determined credit allocation. 40 However, the real policy issue
may be different as TSEs have undeveloped, non-performing financial markets in general,
and no market-based housing finance system in particular.  Two more relevant questions
then are: (1) whether a CSH system would impair the prospects for development of market-
based housing finance; and, (2) if started, can a CSH system be wound down later when the
financial system has deepened.  Answers to both questions rest with the open versus closed
nature  of  the  contracts,  the  size  of  the  loan-to-savings  multiplier,  and  the  level  of
subsidization  of the contracts.  Technical  adjustments in these three variables  are rather
39  Herbst  [1992]
40  See Diamond  and Lea [1  992a].53
straightforward as seen from the evidence presented so far.  The critical factor is to avoid
levels of incentives that may create irreversible rent-seeking behavior on the parts of the
key  market  participants:  households  and  their  political  representatives,  construction
ministries and the building industry,  and the banks and finance ministries.
97.  The issue of net output expansion is much less clear today in TSEs than it
was in the post-War European countries.  The major housing problem in European TSEs is
the mismatch between the current characteristics of the stock (wrong size, poor location,
inappropriate design) and the desires of the residents.  Until the existing stock is privatized
and prices (rents) liberalized, the extent of output need is unknown.
98.  CSH appear to have been successful  in stimulating long-term  savings  in
France and Germany.  A key factor in their early development was the linking of a loan to
satisfactory completion of the savings contract.  However, in recent years the volume of
savings appears to be based more on the after-tax return (including subsidies).  As noted in
the  French  discussion above, there  is great merit  in  subsidizing savings as opposed  to
directly subsidizing housing purchase or construction.  However, if the system is ultimately
going to be based on subsidies,  TSE governments should consider whether broader based
contractual schemes such as pension and insurance plans are not the better way to stimulate
long-term savings.
VII  CONCLUSION
99.  Evaluating the potential of a CSH cannot be dissociated from the economic
and  financial  environment within which  it is  expected to  operate. Historically,  CSH
systems  have  been  very  successful  in  post-War  European  economic,  financial  and
technological environments.  These environments have drastically changed over the last
fifty  years  with  the  revolution  in  information  technology,  financial  innovations,
deregulation, trade liberalization, greater  interest rate volatility, and the acceleration in
the globalization of capital markets especially since the 1980s. Among the 25 or so TSEs
which  are presently  moving  to  markets,  social  cohesion,  political  institutions,  legal
systems, level of economic development and of human capital vary widely.  So does the
potential for rapid financial development.  Yet as latecomers to financial development all
should draw  the  benefits of  international experience.  In  particular, with  the  present
information technologies and the rapid globalization of financial markets the likelihood
that transitional economies can long maintain specialized housing finance circuits as part54
of sheltered domestic financial systems does not appear very high.  For TSEs, the main
features of CSH can be summarized as follows:
*  From a household perspective, CSH contracts facilitate the accumulation of  equity,
and offer the prospect of a low-interest loan.  However, in TSEs, inflation will easily
erode the attractiveness of a CSH to the point that an equity gap will develop between
the financing available and the cost of a unit. A CSH is unlikely to be effective in
mobilizing sufficient long-term capital to meaningfully address the housing finance
requirements  of  TSE  countries  as  long  as  an  environment  of  high  and  volatile
inflation persists.  Also, a CSH is not designed to be the exclusive source of long-term
finance for the purchase of a new or existing housing unit.
*  For  financial  institutions,  A CSH can play a very effective signaling role in sorting
out steady savers.  It can also reduce credit risks in poorly developed retail financial
markets.  CHS with savings phases of 4 to 5 years improve the duration gap between
long-term mortgage loans and typically very short-term deposit liabilities. Depending
on  its  design,  a  CSH  could  create difficult  liquidity risk  management  problems.
However, when the interest rate level on outstanding contracts differs sharply from
current market  rates holders of mature contracts will call their loans,  on the other
hand new savers will be reluctant to sign on at very low contract rates. CSH contracts
can be designed to operate safely in inflationary environments, but such a result is
achieved at the price of lower usefulness to households in terms of rigid contractual
terms and low loan-to-value (LTV) ratios.
*  From  a government  perspective,  CSH  advocates  often  ignore the  fact  that  these
instruments'  basic function is to assist savers in building equity for downpayment.
To complement the second loan resulting from these contracts, funding for primary
mortgage loans must be available.  There will still be  a need for developing other
long-term sources of capital in the economy. The most important lesson of the open
CSH experience is that contract designs with overly generous options in the takeoff
phase of CSH systems can be very successful in mobilizing funds.  But they could
create large contingent liabilities for the government at the worst  time  in financial
cycles.  Control of such risks by financial authorities may lead then to perpetuate
various forms of directed credits.  With the continued segregation of housing finance
from  the  rest  of  the  financial  system  come  inefficiencies  that  such
compartimentalization usually entail.55
101.  There is a critical distinction between closed CSH systems and open ones.
Closed CSH contract systems like the bauspar of Germany are of a strictly mutual nature
and are transparent to monitor.  These closed CSH systems can be wound down relatively
easily under the pressure of competing products as financial development proceeds with
the emergence of market-based long-term finance.  However, to  succeed, these closed
CSH systems also demand a very low level of inflation not too likely to prevail soon in
most TSEs. To mobilize funds rapidly in the initial stages of development of the financial
system, "open" CSH contracts like epargne-logement can be quite effective. They offer
attractive return  to  savers  among whom  a  significant number  do  not  intend  take  up
housing loans immediately at the end of the savings phase. The uncommitted funds thus
mobilized can therefore be used to finance non-contractual long-term loans.  The problem
is that to achieve such effective savings mobilization, open designs offer options to savers
which may render the system opaque and the eventual liberalization of housing finance
more difficult.
102.  To  summarize,  a  CSH  would  have  no  justification  in  perfect  financial
markets today.  The more advanced economically, the more stable financially and the
more rapidly a TSE economy is converging with and opening to Western economies, the
least likely is a CSH going to make a difference. On the other hand, in the take-off phase
of the embryonic and unsteady financial markets of TSEs, CSH could play a role.  In the
initial development of financial systems, CSH may provide "additionality"  in two ways:
(a) by overcoming the severe information problems afflicting financial contracts in TSEs;
and, (b) by contributing to a higher domestic savings rate.
103.  Before  introducing  any  CSH  government  regulators  should  identify  and
thoroughly investigate the financial costs and benefits of every option embedded in the
proposed CSH contract.  They must insure that the CSH design will be compatible with
the long-term development target of a competitive and well integrated financial system.
These designs should be such that the resulting CSH system can wind down when the
financial system will have gained sufficient depth.  That  is to say when retail markets are
developing,  competing savings instruments exists  and  borrower credit evaluations are
becoming effective.  Closed designs should be preferred.
104.  A danger with promoting CSH today is that they may distract attention away
from the steps needed for the development of a complete housing finance system. The first
best policy is give a high priority to the development of broadly-based contractual savings
such as pension funds and life insurance systems. These can form the core of market-based56
long-term finance and support the growth of mortgage bond markets and other secondary
mortgage markets. Like a CSH, this first best policy requires monetary stabilization and
long-term price stability.
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